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MEAN FIELD GAMES OF TIMING AND MODELS FOR BANK RUNS
RENE´ CARMONA, FRANC¸OIS DELARUE, AND DANIEL LACKER
Abstract. The goal of the paper is to introduce a set of problems which we call mean field
games of timing. We motivate the formulation by a dynamic model of bank run in a continuous-
time setting. We briefly review the economic and game theoretic contributions at the root of
our effort, and we develop a mathematical theory for continuous-time stochastic games where
the strategic decisions of the players are merely choices of times at which they leave the game,
and the interaction between the strategic players is of a mean field nature.
1. Introduction
Our starting point is the set of early game theoretic models for the banking system due to
Bryant [9] and Diamond and Dybvig [14] whose fundamental papers proposed banking models
of a game played by depositors in which there always exist at least a good equilibrium and a bad
equilibrium. Many generalizations followed, for example to include illiquidity effects and more
random factors, and extended the scope of the models beyond bank runs and deposit insurance
to include financial intermediation, as in the work [33] of Rochet and Vives. There, the authors
use the methodology of global games proposed by Morris and Shin in [31] and the differences
in opinions among investors to prove existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium. They go
on to analyze the economic and financial underpinnings of bank runs and propose a benchmark
for the role of lenders of last resort. While still in a static framework, the work [17] of Green
and Lin discusses stochastic equilibria (a.k.a. aggregate uncertainty) in a context which is very
close to our notion of weak equilibrium, to be defined later in the paper.
Authors of the early game theoretic papers on bank runs quickly realized that their models
exhibited what is now known as a complementarity property. Typically, if more depositors
withdraw their funds early, then the probability of failure of the bank increases, and this further
incentivizes early withdrawal. Mathematically, the eventual payoff to one depositor displays
increasing differences with respect to the actions of the others depositors. This property is
known as complementarity, and games with this property are called supermodular games. The
equilibrium theory of these games hinges on their order structure more than their analytic
properties (see, for example, [30, 19]), using machinery first developed by Topkis [36, 35] and
later refined by Milgrom and Roberts [30] and Vives [37].
A common feature of many bank run models is the symmetric or mean-field nature of
the interaction between the depositors, and the goal of our paper is to take advantage of this
property to develop a general mathematical theory. While most of the works cited above are
static in nature, our interest in dynamic models of bank runs was sparked by a lecture of
Olivier Gossner at a PIMS Workshop on Systemic Risk in July 2014 who attempted to extend
to a continuous-time setting an earlier work of Rochet and Vives [33]. In this model, the
common source of randomness comes from the value of the investments of the bank and the
possible need for fire sales to face fund redemption, while the differences in the private signals of
the investors contribute to the idiosyncratic sources of noise, ruling out undesirable equilibria.
Another continuous-time bank run model worthy of mention can be found in the paper [18] by
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He and Xiong where the source of randomness comes from the staggered nature of the debt
maturities.
With these bank run models in mind, we propose a general class of continuous-time models
we call mean field games of timing, in which a continuum of agents strategically choose stopping
times, i.e., times at which to exit the game. We present two different sets of results for two
different regimes. Under the aforementioned complementarity property, we prove that “mean
field equilibria” (MFE) exist and illustrate how to use them to construct approximate equilibria
for the corresponding n-player games, and this is done for very general partial information
structures. On the other hand, without complementarities, we derive an existence result for
“weak MFE” under stronger continuity assumptions, and only in the full-information setting.
We then connect weak MFE to n-player games by proving two modes of convergence. On the
one hand, the equilibria themselves in the n-player game (if they exist) converge to weak MFE
as n → ∞. On the other hand, a weak MFE can be used to construct approximate equilibria
for the n-player games.
Our models are closely related to the mean field games introduced independently by Lasry
and Lions [29] and Caines, Huang and Malhame´ in [20]. However in our models, agents act by
choosing stopping times as opposed to control processes. We adhere to a purely probabilistic
approach, though in principle a PDE formulation is possible involving a variational inequality
or free-boundary problem. Probabilistic methods in mean field game theory originated in [10],
although our techniques are more closely related to the weak convergence and compactness
arguments of [12, 28, 26]. While most (continuous-time) mean field game models involve agents
choosing control processes as opposed to stopping times, a notable exception is the recent work of
Nutz [32], which studies a tractable yet versatile model for which equilibria can be computed or
at least characterized quite explicitly. Section 3.4 shows how this model fits into our framework.
Our existence result (Theorem 3.5) based on monotonicity properties resembles some recent
papers on games with both complementarities and a continuum of agents. For instance, Adlakha
and Johari [3] employ some similar techniques to study a discrete time mean field game with
strategic complementarities. The work of Balbus et al. [5] on static games is also quite relevant,
and it even includes a discussion of discrete-time “optimal stopping games,” although stochastic
factors are absent from their model. See also [38] and its correction in [6] for related work on
nonatomic supermodular games. The reader interested in games with complementarities may
also consult the recent work of Acemoglu and Jensen [2, 1] on aggregate games, which closely
resemble mean field games.
The technical crux of our proofs requires some new results, interesting in their own right, on
progressive enlargements of filtrations [23, 8], particularly related to the “compatibility” or “im-
mersion” property (also known as the H-hypothesis) which has recently seen renewed interest in
light of its many applications in credit risk models. Our work necessitates a new characterization
of when a filtration enlarged progressively by a random time satisfies this compatibility prop-
erty: roughly speaking, if a filtration F is generated by a Wiener process W , and if it is enlarged
progressively to G in the minimal way to render a given a random time τ a stopping time, then
F is “compatible” with G if and only if there exists a sequence of F-stopping times τn such that
(W, τn) converges to (W, τ) in distribution. This notion of compatibility arises naturally because
of the central role played by weak convergence arguments in our analysis; essentially the same
issue appears in the papers [12, 28], which deal with more traditional mean field game models.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the continuous-time model of
bank run based on some of the ideas of [33] and Gossner’s lecture mentioned earlier. This is
borrowed from the forthcoming book [11], and we present a streamlined version for the purpose
of motivation. We use continuous time stochastic processes to model the value of the assets
of the bank and the private signals of the depositors. Stylized facts from economic models of
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bank runs are captured in a set of assumptions about the costs and rewards to the depositors,
and a mathematical problem of game of timing is articulated. Section 3 describes a general
mathematical framework generalizing the set-up of the previous section. There, we provide
all the required definitions and notation, and state the first main results of the paper, under
complementarity assumptions. The following Section 4 specializes the setup further to models
with continuous objective functions driven by Wiener processes. No proofs are given in these
sections, only illustrations of how the abstract framework generalizes the bank run presented in
section 2, and how the results answer the questions raised therein. The remainder of the paper,
from Section 5 on, is devoted to the proofs of the results announced in Sections 3 and 4. Section 6,
in particular, develops the requisite material on filtration enlargements and randomized stopping
times, some of which may be of independent interest. Two appendices provide proofs of technical
results which we could not find in the printed literature.
Acknowledgements: We would like to thank Geoffrey Zhu for enlightening discussions at an early
stage of our investigation of mean field games of timing.
2. A Model for Bank Runs
The nature of the balance sheet of a bank and the impact of the fire sales triggered by
depositors runs and the possible failure of the bank are two important elements of the analysis
of bank runs and their consequences, especially from a regulatory perspective. However, for
the purpose of our mathematical analysis, we shall simplify their roles in order to focus on the
optimal timing decisions of the investors.
Suppose the market value of the assets of a bank evolve over time according to some (real-
valued) stochastic process B = (Bt)t≥0, where the initial value B0 > 0 of the bank assets is
known to everyone, and in particular to the depositors. We assume that the assets generate a
flow of dividends at rate r strictly greater than the risk free rate r. These dividends are not
reinvested, so they are not included in Bt. The depositors are promised the same interest rate
r on their deposits. The bank remains in business as long as Bt > 0.
Let n be the number of depositors. We shall eventually let n → ∞ to derive a mean field
game model. For this reason, we normalize the initial deposit of each investor to Di0 = 1/n, so
the aggregate initial deposit is 1. We introduce a (deterministic) function L (typically satisfying
at least L(0) = 0 and 0 < L′ < 1), and we think of the value L(Bt) as the liquidation value of
the assets of the bank at time t. As L is deterministic, it is known to everyone.
Whenever an investor tries to withdraw his or her deposit, the bank taps a credit line at
interest rate r > r to pay the running investor. At time t, the credit line limit is equal to the
liquidation value L(Bt) of the bank’s assets. The model is set up this way to allow the bank to
pay running investors without having to tinker with its investments.
The bank is said to be safe if all depositors can be paid in full, even in case of a run. The
bank is said to have liquidity problems if the current market value of its assets is sufficient to
pay depositors, but the liquidation value is not. Finally, it is said to be insolvent if the current
market value of its assets is less than its obligation to depositors. We shall confirm below that,
in the case of complete information about the value of the assets of the bank, depositors start
to run as soon as the bank has liquidity problems, possibly long before the bank is insolvent.
Let T be a finite time horizon, for the sake of concreteness, but notice that the story to
follow makes just as much sense with T =∞ or even when T is an appropriately random time.
At time T , the bank’s assets mature and generate a single payoff BT which can be used to pay
the credit line and the depositors. Cash flows stop at time T . At that time,
• if BT ≥ 1, the bank is safe and everybody is paid in full;
• if BT < 1, the bank cannot pay everybody in full, there is an exogenous default.
4 RENE´ CARMONA, FRANC¸OIS DELARUE, AND DANIEL LACKER
This is not the only way the bank can default. Indeed there is the possibility of an endogenous
default at time t < T if the aggregate amount of withdrawals by running depositors exceeds
L(Bt). Let us denote by τ
i the time at which depositor i tries to withdraw his or her deposit,
and by µn the empirical distribution of these times, i.e.
µn =
1
n
n∑
i=1
δτ i ,
where we use the notation δx for the probability measure putting mass 1 on the singleton {x}.
Notice that µn[0, t) represents the proportion of depositors who tried to withdraw before time
t, and that the time of endogenous default is given by
τ endo = inf{t ∈ (0, T ); µn[0, t) > L(Bt)},
1
with the convention that the infimum of the empty set is defined as T . For the sake of simplicity
we assume that once a depositor runs, he cannot get back in the game, in other words, his
decision is irreversible.
Depositor Strategic Behavior. We now explain the strategic behavior of the n depositors. We
denote by Fi = (F it )t≥0 the information available to player i ∈ {1, · · · , n}. This is a filtration,
F it representing the information available to player i at time t. In the particular case which
we discuss first, these filtrations are all identical. They are based on a perfect (though non-
anticipative) observation of the signal (Bt)0≤t≤T . We call this situation public monitoring. In a
more realistic form of the model, the filtration Fi is generated by the process Xi,n = (Xi,nt )t≥0
and the process (µn[0, t])t≥0, where X
i,n
t is the private signal of depositor i, namely the value of
the observation of Bt he or she can secure at time t. We shall assume that it is of the form
Xi,nt = Bt + σW
i
t
where σ > 0 and for i ∈ {1, · · · , n}, the processes (W it )t≥0 are independent identically dis-
tributed (i.i.d.) stochastic processes (also independent of B) representing idiosyncratic noise
terms blurring the observations of the exact value Bt of the assets of the bank. When F
i is
generated by Xi,n and (µn[0, t])t≥0, we talk about private monitoring of the asset value of the
bank. However, for an even more realistic form of the model, we shall require that the filtration
F
i is generated simply by Xi,n and does not include the information provided by the process
(µn[0, t])t≥0, which incorporates the private signals of the other depositors. This model should
be more challenging mathematically as the individual depositors will have to choose their with-
drawal strategies in a distributed manner, using only the information contained in their private
signals, ignoring the process (µn[0, t])t≥0.
In any case, the filtrations Fi will be specified in each particular application and will play
the following role: the time τ i chosen by agent i is required to be a Fi-stopping time in order to
be admissible.
Given that all the other players j 6= i have chosen their times τ j to try to withdraw their
deposits, the payoff P i(τ−i, τ i) to depositor i for trying to run on the bank at time τ i can be
written (recalling that Di0 = 1/n) as
P i(τ−i, τ i) = Di0 ∧
(
L(Bτ i)− µ
n[0, τ i)
)+
= Di0 ∧
(
L(Bτ i)−
1
n
n∑
k=1
1[0,τ i)(τ
k)
)+
1Here and throughout the text we write µn[0, t) in place of the somewhat more precise µn([0, t)).
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and the problem of depositor i is then to choose for τ i, the Fi-stopping time solving the maxi-
mization problem
J i(τ−i) = sup
τ i
E
[
e(r−r)τ
i
P i(τ−i, τ i)
]
which is an optimal stopping problem. Any solution τ i of this maximization problem represents
a best response of player i to the choices τ−i of the other depositors. Finding a set of stopping
times τ i for i = 1, . . . , n satisfactory to all the players simultaneously is essentially finding a
fixed point to the search for best responses. This is achieved by finding a Nash equilibrium for
this game.
Solution in the Case of Public Monitoring through Perfect Observation. If we assume
that σ = 0, in which case Fi = FB = (FBt )t≥0, at time t each depositor knows the past up to
time t of the asset value Bs for s ≤ t, and if all the depositor decisions (to run or not to run)
are based only on this information, then for each t ∈ [0, T ], µn[0, t] ∈ FBt since this information
is known by all the depositors at time t.
Proposition 2.1. In the case of public information, if we define the stopping time τˆ by
τˆ = T ∧ inf{t > 0; L(Bt) ≤ 1},
then the unique Nash equilibrium is when all the depositors decide to run at time τˆ .
So a bank run occurs as soon as the bank has liquidity problems, even if this is long before
it is insolvent. Notice also that according to this proposition, all the depositors experience full
recovery of their deposits, which is in flagrant contrast with typical bank runs in which most
depositors usually experience significant losses.
Proof. We first argue that we have indeed identified a Nash equilibrium. If all the other de-
positors but i choose the strategy given by the running time τˆ , we show that player i cannot
do better than choosing to also run at time τˆ . If L(Bτˆ ) ≤ 1, all the others depositors run
immediately, and the only hope investor i has to get something out of his or her deposit is to
run at time τˆ as well. Now if L(Bτˆ ) > 1, no depositor has a reason to run while L(Bt) > 1 since
by not running for a small time interval while L(Bt) is still strictly greater than 1, he or she
can earn the superior interest r > r without facing any risk. This proves that every depositor
using τˆ as time to run is a Nash equilibrium. We do not give the proof of the fact that this
Nash equilibrium is the unique Nash equilibrium since we are not really interested in the public
information case.
The Mean Field Game Formulation. We now consider an asymptotic regime corresponding
to a large number of depositors, sending n→∞, and we track the behavior of a representative
depositor with initial deposit D0 > 0. Although the payoffs P
i themselves decrease to zero,
as Di0 = 1/n, we are not terribly concerned with the asymptotic behavior of the values of the
objective functions, so we may simply rescale P i to nP i in the n-player game without altering the
set of equilibria. Indeed, the main quantity we wish to control in this asymptotic regime is the
empirical distribution of the equilibrium stopping times, as this contains all of the information
describing the timing of the bank run.
When n is large, the usual heuristics for mean field games suggest that, if the process B
giving the asset value of the bank is not deterministic, µn approaches a random measure µ.
In particular, this limiting µ should depend on the time-evolution of B in the sense that µ[0, t]
should be FBt -measurable for each t ∈ [0, T ]. If such a probability measure µ is fixed, one defines
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the individual payoff Pµ(t, y) of a withdrawal attempt at time t when the value of the assets of
the bank is y as:
Pµ(t, y) = D0 ∧
(
L(y)− µ[0, t]
)+
,
and the optimal time for a representative depositor to claim his or her deposit back will be given
by the stopping times solving the optimal stopping problem:
sup
0≤θ≤T
E[e(r−r)θPµ(θ,Bθ)].
The above maximization is understood over all the FX-stopping times θ where the filtration
F
X = (FXt )0≤t≤T is the filtration generated by the signal Xt = Bt + σWt observed at time t
by our generic investor. Here (Wt)0≤t≤T is a process independent of (Bt)0≤t≤T and sharing the
same distribution as each of the W i from before. If we can solve this optimal stopping problem
for each (random) measure µ, we can define a map µ→ Law(τˆ |B) where τˆ is an optimal stopping
time, and the final step of the mean field game approach is to find a fixed point for this map.
The following section formulates the mean field game more precisely and explains the connection
with the n-player game.
3. General Mean Field Games of Timing: Main Results
A compact set of times T ⊂ [0,∞] is fixed throughout, which we assume is either discrete or of
the form [0, T ] for some T ∈ [0,∞]. Fix two filtered probability spaces (Ωcom,Fcom,Fcom,Pcom)
and (Ωind,F ind,Find,Pind), which will house a common noise and an independent (or idiosyn-
cratic) noise, respectively. We are given also a filtration Fsig = (F sigt )t∈T on the product space
Ωcom×Ωind with F sigt ⊂ F
com
t ⊗F
ind
t for every t. This filtration represents the signal or informa-
tion available to an agent. Rather than observing the full filtration Fcom⊗Find of the underlying
noises, an agent sees only Fsig. An objective function is given,
F : Ωcom × Ωind × P(T)× T→ R,
where P(T) denotes the set of Borel probability measures on T. Here F (ω0, ω1,m, t) represents
the reward an agent achieves by stopping at time t, given the values (ω0, ω1) of the common
and independent noises, and given the distribution m of other agents’ stopping times.
With these ingredients, we will formulate both an n-player game and its continuum limit as
n → ∞. Assumption A below will clarify the precise assumptions (measurability, continuity,
etc.) on F , and until then we will tacitly assume the expectations make sense.
Example 3.1. In the example presented in Section 2, we make the following identifications. Let
T = [0, T ], and let (Ωcom,Fcom,Fcom,Pcom) and (Ωind,F ind,Find,Pind) both equal the Wiener
space of continuous real-valued paths. That is, Ωcom = Ωind = C([0, T ]) is equipped with the
Borel σ-field, the Wiener measure, and the natural (augmented) filtration. The sub-filtration
F
sig is the complete filtration generated by the process (W 0t + σW
1
t )t∈[0,T ], where W
0 and W 1
denote the projections from Ωcom×Ωind to Ωcom and to Ωind, respectively. The objective function
(after a renormalization) is
F (ω0, ω1,m, t) = e(r−r)t
[
1 ∧
(
L(ω0t )−m[0, t]
)+]
.
Note that in this example the independent noise ω1 does not appear in the payoff, and its only
role is in specifying the information structure Fsig.
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3.1. The n-player game. The n-player game for n ≥ 1 is defined on the product space
(Ω,F ,F,P) := (Ωcom,Fcom,Fcom,Pcom)⊗
∞⊗
k=1
(Ωind,F ind,Find,Pind).
A typical element of Ω is denoted ~ω = (ω0, ω1, . . .), with ω0 ∈ Ωcom and ωi ∈ Ωind for i ≥ 1. We
call ω0 the common noise and ωi the idiosyncratic noise of agent i. Define the projections
W i(ω0, ω1, . . .) = ωi,
for i = 0, 1, . . .. Finally, for i ≥ 1, define the filtration Fi = (F it )t∈T of the i
th agent by
F it := (W
0,W i)−1(F sigt ) := σ{{(W
0,W i) ∈ C} : C ∈ F sigt }.
Define the empirical measure map µn : Tn → P(T) by
µn(t1, . . . , tn) =
1
n
n∑
k=1
δtk . (3.1)
We will make use of the following common notation: given ~e = (e1, . . . , en) ∈ E
n for some set
E, define
~e−i = (e1, . . . , ei−1, ei+1, . . . , en), and (~e
−i, x) = (e1, . . . , ei−1, x, ei+1, . . . , en),
for x ∈ E and i = 1, . . . , n. To minimize the number of parentheses, we abuse notation somewhat
by writing µn(~t−i, s) in lieu of µn((~t−i, s)), when ~t ∈ Tn and s ∈ T. For ǫ ≥ 0, we say that
~τ = (τ1, . . . , τn) is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium if τi is an F
i-stopping time (defined on Ω) and
E
[
F
(
W 0,W i, µn(~τ), τi
)]
≥ E
[
F
(
W 0,W i, µn
(
~τ −i, σ
)
, σ
)]
− ǫ,
for every alternative Fi-stopping time σ, for each i = 1, . . . , n.
3.2. The mean field game. We next define the infinite-agent counterpart of the above game,
called the mean field game, which is formulated on the product space Ωcom × Ωind. We write
E for expectation under the product measure Pcom × Pind, and we write W 0 and W 1 for the
projections onto Ωcom and Ωind, respectively.
Definition 3.2. A strong mean field equilibrium (MFE) is a Fsig-stopping time τ∗ on Ωcom×Ωind
satisfying
E
[
F (W 0,W 1, µ, τ∗)
]
≥ E
[
F (W 0,W 1, µ, τ)
]
,
for every alternative Fsig-stopping time τ , where
µ = Pcom × Pind[τ∗ ∈ · |W 0] (3.2)
is the regular conditional law of τ∗ given W 0.
We say strong MFE here because later, in Definition 4.2, we will later introduce a notion
of weak MFE. One justification of this strong equilibrium concept is the following theorem,
which explains how to use a strong MFE to construct approximate Nash equilibria for the
n-player games. First, some assumptions are needed. In the following, consider the topol-
ogy σ(P(T), B(T)) generated by the set B(T) of bounded measurable functions of T; that is,
σ(P(T), B(T)) is the coarsest topology on P(T) such that the map m 7→
∫
T
ϕdm is continuous
for every ϕ ∈ B(T). Define the total variation of a signed measure ν on T by
‖ν‖TV = sup
{∫
T
f dν : f ∈ B(T), sup
t∈T
|f(t)| ≤ 1
}
.
In the following, Ωcom × Ωind is always equipped with the probability measure Pcom × Pind.
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Assumption A.
(A.1) F is jointly measurable, with P(T) equipped with the σ-field generated by the maps
m 7→ m(C), where C ⊂ T is a Borel set.2
(A.2) For almost every (ω0, ω1), the map m 7→ F (ω0, ω1,m, t) is σ(P(T), B(T))-continuous,
uniformly in t. That is, for each m0 ∈ P(T), the map
m 7→ sup
t∈T
∣∣F (ω0, ω1,m, t)− F (ω0, ω1,m0, t)∣∣
is σ(P(T), B(T))-continuous at m0.
(A.3) It holds that
E
[
sup
m∈P(T)
sup
t∈T
∣∣F (W 0,W 1,m, t)∣∣] <∞. (3.3)
Assumption (A.2) may appear difficult to verify. On the contrary, there are two broad classes
of examples it covers. First, because σ(P(T), B(T)) is finer than the topology of weak conver-
gence, replacing σ(P(T), B(T))-continuity with weak continuity (i.e., continuity with respect to
the topology of weak convergence) is enough. Moreover, because [0,∞] is compact, joint con-
tinuity of F (ω0, ω1,m, t) in (m, t) implies (A.2). The second class of examples, and indeed the
one that motivates the use of the topology σ(P(T), B(T)), consists of functions F of the form
F (ω0, ω1,m, t) = G(ω0, ω1,m[0, t], t), where G : Ωcom × Ωind × [0, 1] × T → R is measurable. If
G = G(ω0, ω1, u, t) is continuous in u, uniformly in t, for each fixed (ω0, ω1), then F satisfies
(A.2). This follows from a simple lemma, proven in Section 5.
Lemma 3.3. For each m0 ∈ P(T), the map
m 7→ sup
t∈T
|m[0, t] −m0[0, t]|
is σ(P(T), B(T))-continuous at m0.
The following main result illustrates how a mean field equilibrium can be used to construct
near-equilibria for the n-player games. Its proof is given in Section 5.
Theorem 3.4. Suppose assumption A holds. Suppose τ∗ is a mean field equilibrium, and let µ
be as in (3.2). For each k define an Fk-stopping time on Ω by
τk(ω0, ω1, . . . , ωn) = τ∗(ω0, ωk).
Then there exist ǫn ≥ 0 with ǫn → 0 such that ~τ
n = (τ1, . . . , τn) is an ǫn-Nash equilibrium for
each n, and moreover
lim
n→∞
E
[
F (W 0,W k, µn(~τ n), τk)
]
= E
[
F (W 0,W 1, µ, τ∗)
]
, for each k.
3.3. Strategic Complementarities and Existence of MFEs. An existence result for strong
MFE is available, even for discontinuous F , as long as a suitable complementarity property holds,
as was mentioned in the introduction. This section draws heavily on ideas from literature on
games with strategic complementarities [30, 37], which is abundant with existence proofs based
more on monotonicity than continuity. In the following, let us say that a P(T)-valued random
variable µ on Ωcom × Ωind is an Fcom-adapted random measure if µ[0, t] is Fcomt -measurable for
every t ∈ T.
Assumption B.
(B.1) Fsig is right-continuous.
2This σ-field agrees with the Borel σ-field generated by the topology of weak convergence on P(T).
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(B.2) For every pair of Fcom-adapted random measures µ, µ˜ satisfying µ[0, t] ≥ µ˜[0, t] for all
t ∈ T a.s., the process (Mt)t∈T defined by
Mt = F (W
0,W 1, µ˜, t)− F (W 0,W 1, µ, t)
is a submartingale.
(B.3) For each m ∈ P(T), t 7→ F (W 0,W 1,m, t) is upper semicontinuous, almost surely.
(B.4) Conditions (A.1) and (A.3) hold.
If µ ≤ µ˜ in the sense of stochastic order (i.e., if µ˜[0, t] ≤ µ[0, t] a.s. for each t ∈ [0, T ]),
and if τ ≤ τ˜ are stopping times, taking expectations in the submartingale property of Mt in
assumption (B.2) yields
E[F (W 0,W 1, µ˜, τ˜ )]− E[F (W 0,W 1, µ˜, τ)] ≥ E[F (W 0,W 1, µ, τ˜ )]− E[F (W 0,W 1, µ, τ)], (3.4)
property which is usually called increasing differences. Intuitively, assumption (B.2) requires
that for “larger” µ the function F increases more rapidly in expectation with t than it does for
smaller µ. These hypotheses introduce strategic complementarities in the game and recast the
game of timing model as a supermodular game. They are natural in the context of bank run
models, in which the measure µ captures how early people run to the bank. Indeed, if µ˜ ≥ µ in
stochastic order, then under µ more people have run to the bank earlier. Under µ, the reward
an agent gains by waiting from τ to τ˜ > τ should not exceed the same reward under µ˜. In other
words, if people tend to run to the bank earlier, the “cost of waiting” for an investor should be
greater.
While assumption B is all that is needed for existence, the following stronger assumption
will enable a better understanding of the structure of equilibria.
Assumption C.
(C.1) F (W 0,W 1,m, t) is almost surely jointly continuous in (m, t), when P(T) is endowed
with the topology of weak convergence.
(C.2) Condition (A.3) holds.
Theorem 3.5. If assumption B holds, then there exists a strong MFE. If both assumptions B
and C hold, then there exist strong MFEs τ∗ and θ∗ such that for any strong MFE τ we have
θ∗ ≤ τ ≤ τ∗ a.s.
Some examples of assumption B are as follows. First, suppose that for every t ≤ t′, every
(ω0, ω1), and every m,m′ ∈ P(T) satisfying m ≤ m′ in stochastic order (meaning m[0, s] ≥
m′[0, s] for every s), we have
F (ω0, ω1,m′, t′)− F (ω0, ω1,m′, t) ≥ F (ω0, ω1,m, t′)− F (ω0, ω1,m, t).
Then the submartingale part of assumption B holds trivially, as the processM is nondecreasing.
The following proposition and remark show how to verify assumption B for a large class of
examples based on diffusion processes.
Proposition 3.6. Suppose T = [0, T ], and assume the space Ωcom×Ωind supports a continuous
Itoˆ diffusion X = (Xt)t∈[0,T ] with infinitesimal generator L defined on all smooth functions ϕ of
compact support by
Lf(x) = b(x) · ∇f(x) +
1
2
Tr[a(x)∇2f(x)],
where b and a are measurable functions with values in Rd and the set of positive semidefinite
d×d matrices, respectively. Assume F is of the form F (ω0, ω1,m, t) = f(Xt(ω
0, ω1), ϕ∗m(t), t),
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where f is bounded and
ϕ ∗m(t) =
∫
[0,T ]
ϕ(t− s)m(ds).
Moreover, assume f : Rd × R × [−T, T ] ∋ (x, y, t) 7→ f(x, y, t) ∈ R has two bounded continuous
derivatives in x and one in both y and t, and ϕ : [0, T ] → R is continuous. Suppose one of the
following holds:
(i) ϕ is nondecreasing and convex, ∂yf ≥ 0, and also Lxf + ∂tf and ∂yf are nondecreasing in
y for each fixed (x, t), where Lx denotes the action of L on the x variable.
(ii) ϕ is nonincreasing and convex, ∂yf ≤ 0, and also Lxf + ∂tf and ∂yf are nonincreasing in
y for each fixed (x, t).
Assume finally that
E
∫ T
0
sup
y∈R
|a(Xt)∇xf(Xt, y, t)|
2 dt <∞. (3.5)
Then assumptions (B.2-3) and (C.1) hold.
Proof. The only nontrivial claim is that the submartingale property (B.2) holds. To check this,
fix two Fcom-adapted random measures µ and µ˜ satisfying µ[0, t] ≥ µ˜[0, t] a.s. for every t. By
Itoˆ’s formula,
df(Xt, ϕ ∗ µ(t), t) =
{
Lxf(Xt, ϕ ∗ µ(t), t) + ∂tf(Xt, ϕ ∗ µ(t), t) + ∂yf(Xt, ϕ ∗ µ(t), t)ϕ
′ ∗ µ(t)
}
dt
+∇xf(Xt, ϕ ∗ µ(t), t) · a(Xt)dBt,
where B = (Bt)t∈[0,T ] is a standard Brownian motion (defined perhaps on an extension of the
probability space). The assumption (3.5) implies that the dBt term is a martingale. To show
that f(Bt, ϕ ∗ µ(t), t)− f(Bt, ϕ ∗ µ˜(t), t) is a submartingale, it suffices to check that its dt term
is always nonnegative. If µ ≤ µ˜ are as in assumption B, then the dt term of df(Bt, ϕ ∗ µ(t), t)−
df(Bt, ϕ ∗ µ˜(t), t) is precisely
Lxf(Bt, ϕ ∗ µ˜(t), t)− Lxf(Bt, ϕ ∗ µ(t), t)
+∂tf(Bt, ϕ ∗ µ˜(t), t) − ∂tf(Bt, ϕ ∗ µ(t), t)
+∂yf(Bt, ϕ ∗ µ˜(t), t)ϕ
′ ∗ µ˜(t)− ∂yf(Bt, ϕ ∗ µ(t), t)ϕ
′ ∗ µ(t).
Now note that if m ≤ m˜ in stochastic order then
∫
g dm ≤
∫
g dm˜ for every nondecreasing
function g, and in particular if ϕ is nondecreasing (resp. nonincreasing) and convex then ϕ∗m˜ ≥
ϕ ∗m (resp. ≤) and ϕ′ ∗ m˜ ≥ ϕ′ ∗m pointwise. With this in mind, it is straighforward to check
that either set of assumptions ensures that the above quantity is nonnegative. 
The assumption (3.5) is not very restrictive; it holds as soon as ∇xf and a are bounded, or
more generally under linear growth assumptions and suitable integrability for the initial state X0.
The conditions (i-ii) are more restrictive, and the following simple result illustrates more broadly
the limitations of assumption (B.2) in handling a very natural form of mean field interaction. In
particular, Proposition 3.7 suggests that our bank run model cannot satisfy assumption (B.2)
because of the dependence of F (ω0, ω1,m, t) on m[0, t].
Proposition 3.7. Suppose T is continuous, and suppose F (ω0, ω1,m, t) = G(m[0, t]) for some
continuous G : [0, 1] → R which we assume is differentiable on (0, 1). If F satisfies assumption
(B.2), then G is constant.
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Proof. For m, m˜ ∈ P([0, T ]) with m ≤ m˜, assumption (B.2) implies that the deterministic
process G(m˜[0, t])−G(m[0, t]) is a submartingale, which means simply that it is nondecreasing.
In other words, for 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T ,
G(m˜[0, t]) −G(m˜[0, s]) ≥ G(m[0, t]) −G(m[0, s]).
Dividing by t− s and taking limits, we find
G′(F2(t))f2(t) ≥ G
′(F1(t))f1(t),
assuming F1(t) = m[0, t] and F2(t) = m˜[0, t] have derivatives f1 and f2. The point is that
stochastic dominance is not sensitive to changes in density. Given u ∈ (0, 1), there exist m ≤ m˜
and t ∈ [0, T ] such that F2(t) = u while f1(t) = 0 and f2(t) = 1, which implies G
′(u) ≥ 0. On
the other hand, given u ∈ (0, 1), there exist m ≤ m˜ and t ∈ [0, T ] such that F1(t) = u while
f1(t) = 1 and f2(t) = 0, which implies G
′(u) ≤ 0. Thus G′ ≡ 0 on (0, 1). 
3.4. An example. The recent model of Nutz [32], or at least many specializations thereof, can
be shown to satisfy our assumption A. The explicit computations of equilibria in [32] can be
used in tandem with Theorem 3.4 to construct n-player approximate equilibria.
We describe only a simple case of this model, from [32, Section 5.1]. Let T = [0,∞], and
suppose Ωcom = Ωind = D↑ is the space of nondecreasing right-continuous real-valued functions
on [0,∞). Note that for any f ∈ D↑ the limit f(∞) = limt→∞ f(t) exists in R∪{∞}. Constants
c > 0 and r > 0 are given, and the objective function is
F (ω0, ω1,m, t) = exp
(∫ t
0
(
r − ω0(s)− ω1(s)− cm[0, s]
)
ds
)
.
The process γt(ω
0, ω1) = ω0(t)−ω1(t)− cm[0, t] can be interpreted as the agent’s perception of
the rate of bank failure. This perceived rate changes over time, depending on a common factor
ω0 and an independent factor ω1, as well as the fraction of agents who have already run to the
bank. In fact, this is not the primitive form of the objective function given in [32] but is instead
derived in Lemma 2.1 therein (more precisely, equation (2.3)).
It is straightforward to check that assumptions (A.1) holds for this example, and we may
use Lemma 3.3 to check that (A.2) holds as well. Assumption (A.3) holds as long as
E
[
exp
(
sup
t≥0
∫ t
0
(
r −W 0(s)−W 1(s)
)
ds
)]
<∞.
On the other hand, it appears that assumption (B.2) fails for this class of models in most cases.
However, the arguments of [32] lead to explicit computations of MFE when agents have access
to enough information, namely when W 0 and W 0 +W 1 are both adapted to Fsig. Theorem 3.4
can then be used to construct explicit n-player approximate equilibria.
4. Beyond complementarities: Weak equilibria
This section explains how to move past the restrictive assumptions of complementarities by
deriving an existence result and a limit theorem under the modest continuity assumptions on
the objective function. Our time set is now a finite interval T = [0, T ], T > 0. Let C = C([0, T ])
denote the space of continuous real-valued functions on [0, T ], endowed with the supremum
norm. For a Polish space E, we always write P(E) for the space of Borel probability measures
on E, endowed with the topology of weak convergence.
For the rest of this section we specify
Ωcom = Ωind = C,
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The common noise and independent noise will now both be one-dimensional standard Brownian
motions, for the sake of simplicity. This could be generalized in various directions, most obviously
by making these Brownian motions multi-dimensional, and this would not alter the analysis. Let
us write W for the Wiener measure on C, and specialize the setup of Section 3 by setting
P
com = Pind =W.
Write B = (Bt)t∈[0,T ] and W = (Wt)t∈[0,T ] for the canonical processes on C
2, and let FB =
(FBt )t∈[0,T ] and F
W = (FWt )t∈[0,T ] denote their natural (raw) filtrations. The objective function
is now a function F : C2 × P([0, T ]) × [0, T ] → R. Note that the full information version of the
bank run model of Section 2 fits into this specialized setup; see Example 3.1.
The equilibrium concept for the n-player game is as in Section 3.1, but now with full infor-
mation: Given independent Wiener processes B and (W i)ni=1, agent i chooses a random time
τ i, which is required to be a stopping time relative to the full filtration FB,W
1,...,Wn generated
by (B,W 1, . . . ,W n), but we will not spell out the details. Recall that for ǫ ≥ 0 we say that
~τ = (τ1, . . . , τn) is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium if τi is an F
B,W 1,...,Wn-stopping time (with values in
[0, T ]) and if
E
[
F
(
B,W i, µn(~τ), τi
)]
≥ E
[
F
(
B,W i, µn
(
~τ −i, σ
)
, σ
)]
− ǫ,
for every alternative FB,W
1,...,Wn-stopping time σ, for each i = 1, . . . , n. Unfortunately, our
proof techniques seem to be restricted to this full information case; an earlier version of this
paper contained partial-information analogs of the following results, but there was a flaw in the
proof.
We are interested in describing the limiting behavior of Nash equilibria, as n → ∞, in
addition to the converse construction of Theorem 4.5. To this end, we introduce notions of
strong and weak equilibria in analogy with strong and weak solutions of stochastic differential
equations. The strong equilibrium is exactly as in Definition 3.2, but with full information:
Definition 4.1. A strong mean field equilibrium (MFE) is a FB,W -stopping time τ∗ defined on
C2, equipped with the Wiener measure W2, satisfying
E [F (B,W,µ, τ∗)] ≥ E [F (B,W,µ, τ)] ,
for every FB,W -stopping time τ , where µ =W2[τ∗ ∈ ·|B] is the conditional law of τ∗ given B.
The definition of a weak MFE requires care. Because we will work heavily with weak
limits, we must prepare for some loss of measurability, in light of the following basic fact of
weak convergence: if (Z, Yn) are random variables converging weakly to (Z, Y ), and if Yn is
Z-measurable for each n, then there is absolutely no reason to expect that Y is Z-measurable
in the limit, despite the fact that Z does not depend on n. For this reason, we define a notion
of weak MFE in which µ is not required to be B-measurable, and τ may be a randomized
stopping time, in a sense made precise below. In analogy with the definition of weak solutions
for stochastic differential equations, we base the definition of weak solution on the properties
of the joint distribution of (B,W,µ, τ). In fact, for reasons which will become clear later, it
is convenient to include more information by considering not only the conditional law of τ but
rather the joint conditional law of (W, τ). Hence, we work with the canonical space
Ω := C2 × P(C × [0, T ]) × [0, T ], (4.1)
and let (B,W,µ, τ) denote the canonical process given by the natural projections, (B,W ) : Ω→
C2, µ : Ω→ P(C × [0, T ]), and τ : Ω→ [0, T ]. Because we will work with a number of canonical
filtrations on this space, we introduce the following notation which we shall use systematically
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in the sequel. The continuous processes B andW each generate filtrations FB = (FB)t∈[0,T ] and
F
W , respectively, defined in the natural way. The random time τ generates the raw filtration
Fτt = σ{τ ∧ t}.
The filtration generated by multiple processes is denoted, for instance, by FB,W := FB ∨ FW ,
or FB,Wt = σ(F
B
t ∪ F
W
t ). We use the same notation F
W,τ not only for the filtration FW ∨ Fτ
defined on Ω, but also for the filtration generated on C × [0, T ], and this should not cause any
confusion. With this identification, the filtration Fµ = (Fµt )t∈[0,T ] on Ω (or on P(C × [0, T ])) is
defined by
Fµt = σ{µ(C) : C ∈ F
W,τ
t }.
Equivalently, if πt is defined on C × [0, T ] by πt(w, s) = (w·∧t, s ∧ t), then F
µ
t = σ{µ ◦ π
−1
t }. We
also write
µW = µ(· × [0, T ]), µτ = µ(C × ·),
for the two marginals of µ, which take values in P(C) and P([0, T ]), respectively. Given a
filtration F = (Ft)t∈[0,T ], we write F+ for the right-continuous filtration (Ft+)t∈[0,T ], where as
usual Ft+ := ∩s>tFs for t ∈ [0, T ) and FT+ = FT . Note that the right-filtration F
τ
+ is the
smallest filtration for which τ is a stopping time, and for this reason the appearance of right-
continuous filtrations in the following definition quite natural:
Definition 4.2. A weak mean field equilibrium (MFE) is a probability measure P on Ω such
that:
(1) (B,W ) is a Wiener process with respect to the full filtration FB,W,µ,τ+ .
(2) (B,µ) is independent of W .
(3) τ is compatible with (B,W,µ), in the sense that Fτt+ is conditionally independent of
FB,W,µT given F
B,W,µ
t+ , for every t ∈ [0, T ].
(4) The optimality condition holds:
E
P [F (B,W,µτ , τ)] = sup
P ′
E
P ′[F (B,W,µτ , τ)],
where the supremum is over all P ′ ∈ P(Ω) satisfying (1-3) as well as P ′ ◦ (B,W,µ)−1 =
P ◦ (B,W,µ)−1.
(5) The weak fixed point condition holds: µ = P ((W, τ) ∈ · | B,µ).
The following result is the first justification for the above definition, and after stating it we
will elaborate further on the intuitive meaning of a weak MFE. Recall that W denotes Wiener
measure, and write W2 =W ×W for the product measure on C2.
Proposition 4.3. Assume that F is bounded and jointly measurable and that t 7→ F (b, w,m, t)
is continuous, for every m and W2-almost every (b, w). Suppose τ∗ is a strong MFE, and define
µ =W2(τ∗ ∈ ·|B). Then the measure
P =W2 ◦ (B,W,µ, τ∗)−1 (4.2)
is a weak MFE.
The proof of Proposition 4.3 is in Section 6. With some abuse of terminology, we may refer
to the measure P itself, defined in (4.2), as a strong MFE. We may define also some intermediate
notions of MFE. It may happen that τ is a.s. (B,W,µ)-measurable under P , in which case we
say P is a weak MFE with strong stopping time.3 In contrast, we may refer to a weak MFE
3To say that τ is a.s. (B,W,µ)-measurable under P means that τ is measurable with respect to the P -
completion of σ(B,W,µ). Equivalently, there exists a measurable map τ˜ : C2 × P(C × [0, T ]) → [0, T ] such that
P (τ = τ˜ (B,W,µ)) = 1.
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more verbosely as a weak MFE with weak stopping time, to emphasize the failure of τ to be
(B,W,µ)-measurable. Likewise, we say that a weak MFE P is a strong MFE with weak stopping
time if µ is P -a.s. B-measurable. A strong MFE with strong stopping time, naturally, requires
both of these measurability conditions, and according to Proposition 4.3 this reduces to what
we have already called a strong MFE.
The “compatibility” condition (3) of Definition 4.2 is somewhat unusual. As mentioned
above, we cannot expect τ to be (B,W,µ)-measurable after taking weak limits, but conditions (3)
captures an important structure we do retain, as does the requirement in (1) that (B,W ) remain
Wiener processes with respect to the larger filtration. Similar compatibility conditions were
identified in the stochastic differential mean field games in [28, 12] (see also [11]), and indeed these
notions of compatibility all fall under the same umbrella, which we clarify somewhat in Section
6. Intuitively, our representative agent is allowed to randomize her stopping time externally to
the signal (B,W,µ), as long as at each time t this randomization is conditionally independent of
all future information given the history of the signal. Mathematically, the reason compatibility
arises is the following, stated informally here and made precise in Theorem 6.4: given τ satisfying
(3), there exists a sequence of FB,W,µ-stopping times τk such that (B,W,µ, τk) ⇒ (B,W,µ, τ),
where ⇒ denotes convergence in law. In this sense, the set of compatible stopping times is the
closure of the set of bona fide stopping times.
Continuous Objective Functions. We are nearly ready to state the main results of this
section, but first we need some assumptions:
Assumption D. The function F is bounded and jointly measurable, and P([0, T ]) × [0, T ] ∋
(m, t) 7→ F (b, w,m, t) is continuous for W2-almost every (b, w) ∈ C2, when P([0, T ]) is equipped
with the topology of weak convergence.
The boundedness assumption is for convenience only, and this could easily be relaxed at the
cost of some careful growth or integrability assumptions. The continuity assumption is important
for our weak convergence methods, but unfortunately it can be restrictive. For instance, our bank
run model in the introduction involved the discontinuous function P([0, T ]) × [0, T ] ∋ (m, t) 7→
m[0, t]. A close approximation of the bank run model could be accounted for nonetheless by
replacing m[0, t] by φ ∗m(t) =
∫
[0,T ] φ(t− s)m(ds), where φ : [−T, T ]→ R is continuous and in
some sense “close to” the step function 1[0,T ].
The first result is a limit theorem, stating that n-player equilibria converge to weak MFE.
Recall the notation of the n-player game in Section 3.1. For each n and each t1, . . . , tn ∈ [0, T ]
we define the random joint empirical measure (a measure on C × [0, T ])
µ̂n(t1, . . . , tn) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
δ(W i,ti). (4.3)
Theorem 4.4. Suppose assumption D holds. Let ǫn ≥ 0 with ǫn → 0, and suppose ~τ
n =
(τn1 , . . . , τ
n
n ) is an ǫn-Nash equilibrium for the n-player game for each n. Define
Pn =
1
n
n∑
i=1
P ◦
(
B,W i, µ̂n(~τ n), τni
)−1
.
Then (Pn)
∞
n=1 is tight, and every weak limit is a weak MFE.
The measure Pn appearing in Theorem 4.4 is quite a natural object to study, if interpreted
the right way. We may write Pn = P ◦ (B,W
U , µ̂n(~τ n), τnU )
−1, where U is a random variable
drawn uniformly from {1, . . . , n}, independent of (B,W i)∞i=1. Think of this as a randomly selected
representative agent. As τni may fail to be symmetric in any useful sense, one would not get far
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by working with, say, P◦(B,W 1, µ̂n(~τ n), τn1 )
−1, which corresponds to arbitrarily choosing agent
1 as the representative. The same idea appears in the following converse to Theorem 4.4, which
is an analog of Theorem 3.4 for the case of weak equilibria.
Theorem 4.5. Suppose assumption D holds. Let P be a weak MFE. Then there exist ǫn → 0
and ǫn-Nash equilibria ~τ
n = (τn1 , . . . , τ
n
n ) such that
P = lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
P ◦
(
B,W i, µ̂n(~τ n), τni
)−1
.
In fact, if τ∗ = τ∗(B,W ) is a strong MFE in the sense of Definition 4.1, then we can take ~τ n
of the form τni = τ
∗(B,W i).
Finally, we state an existence result for weak MFE. Combined with Theorem 4.5, it shows
that approximate n-player equilibria exist for the n-player games.
Theorem 4.6. Under assumption D, there exists a weak MFE.
Some comments are in order at this stage. Combining the two limit theorems tells us that
the set of weak MFEs is precisely the set of limits of n-player approximate equilibria. If we
can find a strong MFE τ∗, the converse limit theorem 4.5 shows how to construct from it an
approximate n-player equilibria in a pleasantly symmetric and distributed form, as in Theorem
3.4. The general structure of the results and arguments are similar to [28, 12].
5. Proofs in the general setup
This section proves the results of Section 3. Throughout this section, we work on the space
(Ω,F ,F,P) defined in Section 3.1. With some abuse of notation, any function φ on Ωcom×Ωind
is automatically extended to all of Ω by setting
φ(ω0, ω1, . . .) := φ(ω0, ω1).
Proof of Theorem 3.4. Abbreviate ~τ n,−k := (~τ n)−k, and define
ǫn = sup
τ˜
E
[
F (W 0,W 1, µn(~τ n,−1, τ˜), τ˜ )
]
− E
[
F (W 0,W 1, µn(~τ n), τ1)
]
,
where the supremum is over F1-stopping times. Clearly ǫn ≥ 0. By symmetry, the index 1 could
be replaced by any k ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Hence, ~τ n is an ǫn-Nash equilibrium for each n. We must
only show that ǫn → 0.
First we show that
lim
n→∞
E
[
sup
t∈T
∣∣F (W 0,W 1, µn(~τ n), t)− F (W 0,W 1, µ, t)∣∣] = 0. (5.1)
Note that the basic open sets of σ(P(T), B(T)) are of the form
U =
{
m ∈ P(T) :
∣∣∣∣∫
T
ϕi d(m− m˜)
∣∣∣∣ < ǫ, i = 1, . . . , k} ,
for k ≥ 1, ǫ > 0, and ϕ1, . . . , ϕk ∈ B(T). Because (τ
k = τ∗(W 0,W k))∞k=1 are conditionally i.i.d.
given W 0, and their common conditional law is µ = µ(W 0), the law of large numbers yields
P
(
µn(~τ n) /∈ U |W 0 = ω0
)
→ 0, (5.2)
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for almost every ω0, for every basic σ(P(T), B(T))-open neighborhood U of µ(ω0). Thanks to
the continuity assumption (A.2), for each δ > 0 and almost every (ω0, ω1) we can find a basic
σ(P(T), B(T))-open neighborhood U of µ(ω0) such that ν ∈ U implies
sup
t∈T
∣∣F (ω0, ω1, ν, t)− F (ω0, ω1, µ(ω0), t)∣∣ < δ.
Thus, for a.e. ω0,
P
(
sup
t∈T
∣∣F (W 0,W 1, µn(~τ n), t)− F (W 0,W 1, µ(W 0), t)∣∣ ≥ δ∣∣∣∣W 0 = ω0)→ 0.
Thanks to assumption (A.3), the limit (5.1) follows from dominated convergence.
Next, we argue that
lim
n→∞
sup
τ˜
E
[
F (W 0,W 1, µn(~τ n,−1, τ˜), τ˜ )
]
= sup
τ˜
E
[
F (W 0,W 1, µ, τ˜)
]
. (5.3)
Indeed, using the easy estimate
sup
t∈T
‖µn(~τ n,−1, t)− µn(~τ n)‖TV ≤ 2/n,
along with (5.2), we deduce that for almost every ω0 and for every basic σ(P(T), B(T))-open
neighborhood U of µ(ω0), we have
lim
n→∞
P
(
µn(~τ n,−1, t) /∈ U, for some t ∈ T
∣∣W 0 = ω0) = 0.
Repeat the argument leading to (5.1) above to get
E
[
sup
t∈T
∣∣F (W 0,W 1, µn(~τ n,−1, t), t)− F (W 0,W 1, µ, t)∣∣]→ 0.
Finally, we conclude from (5.1), (5.3), and the optimality of τ∗ that
lim
n→∞
ǫn = sup
τ˜
E
[
F (W 0,W 1, µ, τ˜ )
]
− E
[
F (W 0,W 1, µ, τ∗)
]
= 0.

Proof of Lemma 3.3. Fix ǫ > 0. Find a finite set 0 = t0 < t1 < · · · < tN = supT such that
m(tk, tk+1) ≤ ǫ for every k = 0, . . . , N − 1. Consider the σ(P(T), B(T))-open neighborhood U
of m0 given by
U = {m ∈ P(T) : |m(tk, tk+1)−m0(tk, tk+1)| ∨ |m[0, tk]−m0[0, tk]| < ǫ, ∀k = 0, . . . , N − 1} .
For m ∈ U and t ∈ (tk, tk+1) we have
|m[0, t]−m0[0, t]| ≤ |m[0, t] −m[0, tk]|+ |m[0, tk]−m0[0, tk]|+ |m0[0, tk]−m0[0, t]|
≤ m(tk, t] +m0(tk, t] + |m[0, tk]−m0[0, tk]|
≤ m(tk, tk+1) +m0(tk, tk+1) + |m[0, tk]−m0[0, tk]|
≤ 3ǫ.
Setting π = {t0, . . . , tN−1}, we have, for m ∈ U ,
sup
t∈T
|m[0, t]−m0[0, t]| = sup
t/∈π
|m[0, t]−m0[0, t]| ∨max
t∈π
|m[0, t] −m0[0, t]| ≤ 3ǫ.

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Existence under supermodularity. In this section, we prove Theorem 3.5. Let S denote
the set of (equivalence classes of a.s. equal) Fsig-stopping times, and let M denote the set of
(equivalence classes of a.s. equal) P(T)-valued random variables µ, which are Fcom-adapted in
the sense that µ[0, t] is a.s. Fcomt -measurable for each t. Equip S with the almost sure partial
order, meaning that we interpret the inequality τ ≤ τ ′ as holding almost surely. Equip M with
the almost sure stochastic order, meaning that µ′ ≥ µ if and only if µ′[0, t] ≤ µ[0, t] a.s. for
each t ∈ [0, T ], and note that right-continuity renders the order of quantifiers inconsequential.
Note that M is a lattice, namely a partially ordered set in which every two elements have a
unique least upper bound and a unique greatest lower bound; for example µ ∨ µ′ is the random
measure defined by (µ∨ µ′)[0, t] = µ[0, t]∧ µ′[0, t]. On the other hand, S is a complete lattice in
the sense that it is a partially ordered set in which every subset has both a supremum and an
infimum. Indeed, the notion of “essential supremum” provides the correct supremum operation
on S, and the completeness follows from the assumption (B.1) that the filtration Fsig is right-
continuous. The completeness of the lattice of stopping times is surely known, but we prove it
in the Appendix (Theorem B.2) as we were unable to locate a precise reference.
Now define J :M×S → R by
J(µ, τ) = E[F (B,W,µ, τ)].
Note that J(µ, τ) is trivially supermodular in τ , in the sense that
J(µ, τ ∨ τ ′) + J(µ, τ ∧ τ ′) ≥ J(µ, τ) + J(µ, τ ′),
for every µ ∈ M and every pair τ, τ ′ ∈ S. In fact, this holds with equality, which follows from
taking expectations on both sides of the identity
F (B,W,µ, τ ∨ τ ′) + F (B,W,µ, τ ∧ τ ′) = F (B,W,µ, τ) + F (B,W,µ, τ ′).
Moreover, assumption (B.2) ensures that J has increasing differences with respect to µ, in the
sense that
J(µ′, τ ′)− J(µ′, τ) ≥ J(µ, τ ′)− J(µ, τ),
whenever τ, τ ′ ∈ S and µ, µ′ ∈ M satisfy τ ≤ τ ′ and µ ≤ µ′. From Topkis’s monotonicity
theorem [30], we deduce that the set-valued map
Φ(µ) := argmax
τ∈S
J(µ, τ)
is increasing in the strong set order, meaning that whenever µ, µ′ ∈ M satisfy µ ≤ µ′, and
whenever τ ∈ Φ(µ) and τ ′ ∈ Φ(µ′), we have τ ∨ τ ′ ∈ Φ(µ′) and τ ∧ τ ′ ∈ Φ(µ). It is readily
checked that J is order upper semicontinuous in τ , using the assumed upper semicontinuity
of F in τ along with Fatou’s lemma, justified by the integrability assumption (3.3). By [30,
Theorem 1], this implies that for every µ, Φ(µ) is a nonempty complete lattice. In particular, it
has a maximum, which we denote φ∗(µ) and a minimum which we denote by φ∗(µ). Note that
φ∗ :M→ S is increasing in the sense that µ′ ≥ µ implies φ∗(µ′) ≥ φ∗(µ). Moreover, it is plain
to check that the function ψ : S →M defined by ψ(τ) = Law(τ |W 0) is monotone. Thus φ∗ ◦ ψ
is a monotone map from S to itself, and since S is a complete lattice we conclude from Tarski’s
fixed point theorem that there exists τ such that τ = φ∗(ψ(τ)). It is readily verified that any
such fixed point τ is a strong MFE, in the sense of Definition 4.1.
Now, under the additional assumption C, we prove the last claim in the statement of
Theorem 3.5. Define τ0 ≡ supT, and by induction τn = φ
∗ ◦ ψ(τn−1) for n ≥ 1. Clearly,
τ1 ≤ τ0. Now if we assume τn ≤ τn−1, then the monotonicity of φ
∗ ◦ ψ proved earlier implies
τn+1 = φ
∗ ◦ ψ(τn) ≤ φ
∗ ◦ ψ(τn−1) = τn. If we define τ
∗ as the a.s. limit of the nonincreasing
sequence (τn)n≥1 of stopping times, then τ
∗ ∈ S because the lattice S is complete (see Theorem
B.2). We claim that τ∗ is a MFE. Note that ψ(τn) → ψ(τ
∗) weakly almost surely, because
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τn → τ
∗. The assumption (C.1) of joint continuity of F = F (ω0, ω1,m, t) in (m, t), along with
the uniform integrability assumption (C.2) ensure by dominated convergence that
J(ψ(τ∗), τ∗) = lim
n→∞
J(ψ(τn), τn+1).
Moreover, for any σ ∈ S, the fact that τn+1 ∈ Φ(ψ(τn)) implies
J(ψ(τn), τn+1) ≥ J(ψ(τn), σ).
Pass to the limit on both sides to get
J(ψ(τ∗), τ∗) ≥ J(ψ(τ∗), σ).
This shows τ∗ ∈ Φ(ψ(τ∗)), and in particular τ∗ is a MFE.
Similarly, define θ0 ≡ 0, and by induction θn = φ∗ ◦ ψ(θn−1) for n ≥ 1. Clearly, θ1 ≥ θ0,
and as above, we prove by induction that θn ≥ θn−1. Next, we define θ
∗ as the a.s. limit of the
nondecreasing sequence (θn)n≥1 of stopping times. Conclude as before that θ
∗ is a MFE.
Finally, it is plain to check that if τ is any MFE, it is a fixed point of the set-valued map
Φ ◦ ψ, in the sense that τ ∈ Φ(ψ(τ)). Trivially, θ0 = 0 ≤ τ ≤ supT = τ0. Applying φ∗ ◦ ψ and
φ∗ ◦ψ repeatedly to the left and right sides, respectively, we conclude that θn ≤ τ ≤ τn for each
n, and thus θ∗ ≤ τ ≤ τ∗. 
Remark 5.1. The above proof shows that, under the full continuity assumption, there is no need
to use Tarski’s theorem to prove existence, as the MFEs τ∗ and θ∗ are constructed inductively.
6. Compatibility and the density of non-randomized stopping times
This section elaborates on the crucial notion of compatibility introduced in property (3) of
Definition 4.2 and, in doing so, takes some first steps toward proving the results announced in
Section 4. Here, our goal is to discuss some important facts about these compatibility proper-
ties, namely how to approximate compatible (randomized) stopping times with nonrandomized
stopping times. Essentially, this has to do with filtration enlargements. To say that Fτt+ is
conditionally independent of FB,W,µT given F
B,W,µ
t+ is the same as saying that F
B,W,µ,τ
t+ is condi-
tionally independent of FB,W,µT given F
B,W,µ
t+ . To say that this holds for every t ∈ [0, T ), it turns
out, is equivalent to saying that every FB,W,µ+ -martingale remains a F
B,W,µ,τ
+ -martingale. Many
different names and characterizations are associated to this property of a filtration enlargement,
such as the H-hypothesis [8], immersion [23], very good extensions [22], and natural extensions
[24], while we borrow the term compatible from Kurtz [25], to be consistent with other works on
mean field games [28, 12, 11]. Before we proceed, we recall a useful result on weak convergence
which will be used repeatedly:
Lemma 6.1 (Corollary 2.9 and Theorem 2.16 of [21]). Suppose E and E′ are Polish spaces.
Suppose Pn, P ∈ P(E × E
′) satisfy Pn → P , and suppose that every Pn has the same E-
marginal. That is, Pn(· × E
′) does not depend on n. Then, for every bounded measurable
function φ : E × E′ → R such that φ(x, ·) is continuous on E′ for µ-almost every x ∈ E, we
have ∫
φdPn →
∫
φdP.
Of utmost importance to us is the behavior of compatibility under weak limits of the under-
lying probability measures. The key result is the following, which says roughly that a compatible
process is the weak limit of adapted processes.
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Proposition 6.2. Let X and Y be Polish spaces, with X homeomorphic to a convex subset
of a locally convex space. Let Y = (Y1, . . . , YN ) and X = (X1, . . . ,XN ) be Y- and X -valued
stochastic processes, respectively, defined on a common probability space. For R ∈ {X,Y },
let FRn = σ{R1, . . . , Rn} denote the filtration generated by R. Assume that the law of Y1 is
nonatomic. Lastly, assume that X is compatible with Y in the sense that FXn is conditionally
independent of FYN given F
Y
n , for each n = 1, . . . , N . Then there exist continuous functions
hjk : Y
k → X , for k ∈ {1, . . . , N} and j ≥ 1, such that
(Y, (hj1(Y1), h
j
2(Y1, Y2), . . . , h
j
N (Y1, . . . , YN )))→ (Y,X)
in law in the space YN×XN , as j →∞. In particular, there exist Y -adapted X -valued processes
Xj = (Xj1 , . . . ,X
j
N ) such that (Y,X
j)⇒ (Y,X).
Proof. See Appendix A. 
6.1. Randomized stopping times. This section is devoted to some compactness properties
of randomized stopping times, analogous to, but extending results of Baxter and Chacon [7].
Abbreviate
Ωinput = C
2 × P(C × [0, T ]).
For this section, fix a measure ρ ∈ P(Ωinput), to represent a joint law of (B,W,µ), and assume,
under ρ, that (B,W ) are Wiener processes with respect to the filtration FB,W,µ (and thus also
with respect to the right-filtration FB,W,µ+ ). Note that Ω = Ωinput × [0, T ].
We next define three sets of probability measures on Ω, corresponding to various notions of
(randomized) stopping times:
• R+(ρ) is the set of joint laws P ∈ P(Ω) with Ωinput-marginal ρ such that F
τ
t+ is condi-
tionally independent of (B,W,µ) given FB,W,µt+ for every t ∈ [0, T ). That is, R
+(ρ) is
the set of P satisfying the compatibility property (3) of Definition 4.2.
• R(ρ) is the set of joint laws P ∈ P(Ω) with Ωinput-marginal ρ such that F
τ
t is condition-
ally independent of (B,W,µ) given FB,W,µt , for every t ∈ [0, T ).
• R0(ρ) is the set of P ∈ P(Ω) with Ωinput-marginal ρ under which τ is a stopping time
relative to the P -completion of FB,W,µ, and moreover τ is of the form τ = τˆ(B,W,µ) for
some continuous function τˆ : Ωinput → [0, T ].
Both sets R+(ρ) and R(ρ) represent slightly different notions of randomized stopping time,
though we will soon see that R+(ρ) = R(ρ). On the other hand, R0(ρ) should be seen as the
set of (joint laws of) bona fide FB,W,µ-stopping times, with the useful additional property that
τ can be written as a continuous function of (B,W,µ).
Remark 6.3. Suppose ρ(db, dw, dm) = W(db)W(dw)δm̂(b)(dm) for some measurable function
m̂ : C → P(C × [0, T ]). Suppose m̂ is adapted in the sense that b 7→ m̂(b)(C) is FBt -measurable
whenever C ∈ FW,τt , for t ∈ [0, T ]. Then, under ρ, F
B,W,µ
t = F
B,W
t a.s., for every t. It
is then easy to argue that R+(ρ) (resp. R(ρ)) is precisely the set of joint laws P ∈ P(Ω)
with Ωinput-marginal ρ such that (B,W ) is a Wiener process with respect to the full filtration
F
B,W,µ,τ
+ (resp. F
B,W,µ,τ ). Indeed, because FB,WT can be split into two independent parts,
FB,WT = σ{(Bs−Bt,Ws−Wt) : s ∈ [t, T ]}∨F
B,W
t , it holds that F
τ
t is conditionally independent
of FB,WT given F
B,W
t if and only if F
B,W,τ
t is independent of σ{(Bs −Bt,Ws −Wt) : s ∈ [t, T ]}.
Theorem 6.4. For ρ as above, R+(ρ) is convex and compact and equals the closure of R0(ρ).
Moreover, R+(ρ) = R(ρ).
Before turning to the proof, we state an immensely useful corollary:
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Corollary 6.5. Assume that F is bounded and jointly measurable and that t 7→ F (b, w,m, t) is
continuous, for every m and W2-almost every (b, w). For ρ as above, we have
sup
P∈R+(ρ)
E
P [F (B,W,µτ , τ)] = sup
P∈R0(ρ)
E
P [F (B,W,µτ , τ)].
Proof. By Theorem 6.4, R0(ρ) is dense in R
+(ρ). It suffices to show that P 7→ EP [F (B,W,µ, τ)]
is continuous on R+(ρ). But this follows from the assumption on F and from Lemma 6.1. 
We precede the proof of Theorem 6.4 with a preparatory lemma, which allows us to map
continuously between stopping times and ca`dla`g processes of a certain form. In the rest of this
section, let D = D([0, T ];R+) denote the set of ca`dla`g functions (i.e., right-continuous with left
limits) functions from [0, T ] to R+ = [0,∞). Endow D with the usual Skorohod J1 topology.
As usual, for h ∈ D, write h(t−) = lims↑t h(s) for t ∈ (0, T ] and h(0−) = h(0).
Lemma 6.6. Define Φ : D → [0, T ] by
Φ(h) = inf {t ≥ 0 : h(t) ≥ 1/2} ∧ T.
Let S denote the set of nondecreasing h ∈ D for which h(t−) ≤ 1/2 ≤ h(t) implies t = Φ(h).
Then Φ is continuous at each point of S.
Proof. Let hn → h in D, where h ∈ S. Let sn = Φ(hn), and note that (sn)
∞
n=1 is bounded.
Let (snk)
∞
k=1 denote any convergent subsequence, and let s ∈ [0, T ] denote its limit. Assume
first that 0 < s < T , so that without loss of generality we may take 0 < snk < T for every k.
Because hnk → h and snk → s, it follows that (hnk(snk))
∞
k=1 is bounded, and its limit points
are contained in {h(s−), h(s)} (see [15, Proposition 3.6.5]). Because hnk(snk) ≥ 1/2 for every
k and h(s) ≥ h(s−) (as h ∈ S), we conclude that h(s) ≥ 1/2. On the other hand, for ǫ > 0,
(hnk(snk−ǫ))
∞
k=1 is bounded, and its limit points are contained in {h((s−ǫ)−), h(s−ǫ)}. Because
hnk(snk − ǫ) < 1/2 for every k and h((s − ǫ)−) ≤ h(s − ǫ), we conclude that h(s − ǫ) ≤ 1/2.
Sending ǫ ↓ 0 yields h(s−) ≤ 1/2 ≤ h(s) and thus s = Φ(h).
Next, suppose s = T . Then again (hnk(snk − ǫ))
∞
k=1 is bounded, and its limit points are
contained in {h((T − ǫ)−), h(T − ǫ)}. Because hnk(snk − ǫ) < 1/2 for each k and h((T − ǫ)−) ≤
h(T − ǫ), we conclude that h((T − ǫ)−) ≤ 1/2. This implies h(T−) ≤ 1/2, which is enough to
show that Φ(h) = T ; indeed, either h(T ) ≥ 1/2, in which case Φ(h) = T because h ∈ S, or
h(T ) < 1/2, in which case h(t) < 1/2 for all t ∈ [0, T ] and again Φ(h) = T .
Finally, suppose s = 0. Then hnk(snk) → h(0) = h(0−), which shows h(0) ≥ 1/2. Thus
Φ(h) = 0. 
Before we begin the proof of Theorem 6.4, notice that FB,W,µt = σ{B·∧t,W·∧t, µ
t}, where
mt denotes the image of a measure m ∈ P(C × [0, T ]) through the map C × [0, T ] ∋ (w, s) 7→
(w·∧t, s∧ t). This makes it clear that F
B,W,µ
t is generated by the continuous F
B,W,µ
t -measurable
functions. Similarly, Fτt = σ{τ ∧ t} is generated by the continuous F
τ
t -measurable functions.
Proof of Theorem 6.4. We break the proof up into four claims:
R(ρ) is compact: Because the Ωinput-marginal of any element of R(ρ) is ρ, and because
[0, T ] is compact, it is immediate that R(ρ) is tight. To show R(ρ) is closed, let Pn → P
in P(Ωinput), with Pn ∈ R(ρ). Let ft, gT , and gt be bounded continuous functions on [0, T ],
Ωinput, and Ωinput, respectively, and assume they are measurable with respect to F
τ
t , F
B,W,µ
T ,
and FB,W,µt . Find a bounded F
B,W,µ
t -measurable function φt on Ωinput such that φt(B,W,µ) =
E
P [gT (B,W,µ)|F
B,W,µ
t ]. Because Pn ◦ (B,W,µ)
−1 = P ◦ (B,W,µ)−1 = ρ for every n, we have
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φt(B,W,µ) = E
Pn [gT (B,W,µ)|F
B,W,µ
t ]. Thus, by Lemma 6.1,
E
P [ft(τ)gT (B,W,µ)gt(B,W,µ)] = lim
n→∞
E
Pn [ft(τ)gT (B,W,µ)gt(B,W,µ)]
= lim
n→∞
E
Pn [ft(τ)φt(B,W,µ)gt(B,W,µ)]
= EP [ft(τ)φt(B,W,µ)gt(B,W,µ)].
As remarked before the proof, the continuous bounded functions generate FB,W,µt and F
τ
t , and
we concude that
E
P [ft(τ)gT (B,W,µ)gt(B,W,µ)] = E
P [ft(τ)E
P [gT (B,W,µ)|F
B,W,µ
t ]gt(B,W,µ)],
for all bounded functions ft, gT , gt with the same measurability requirements as above, but
without the continuity requirements. This shows that Fτt is conditionally independent of F
B,W,µ
T
given FB,W,µt under P , for every t ∈ [0, T ), so P ∈ R(ρ).
R(ρ) = R+(ρ): First we show R(ρ) ⊂ R+(ρ). Fix t ∈ [0, T ) and P ∈ R(ρ). For
A ∈ FB,W,µT and C ∈ F
τ
t , we have
P(C|FB,W,µt )P(A|F
B,W,µ
t ) = P(C ∩A|F
B,W,µ
t ).
By backward martingale convergence, taking decreasing limits in t yields
P(C|FB,W,µt+ )P(A|F
B,W,µ
t+ ) = P(C ∩A|F
B,W,µ
t+ ).
This shows that R(ρ) ⊂ R+(ρ), and we know from before that R(ρ) is closed. Hence, it suffices
to show that every point P ∈ R+(ρ) is the limit point of a sequence in R(ρ). To see this, set
Pn := P ◦ (B,W,µ, (τ + 1/n) ∧ T )
−1,
which converges weakly to P . Because Fτt+ is conditionally independent of F
B,W,µ
T given F
B,W,µ
t+
under P , we have, for 0 < s ≤ t < T ,
Pn(τ ≤ s|F
B,W,µ
T ) = P (τ ≤ s− 1/n|F
B,W,µ
T ) = P (τ ≤ s− 1/n|F
B,W,µ
(t−1/n)+)
= Pn(τ ≤ s|F
B,W,µ
(t−1/n)+).
Because FB,W,µ(t−1/n)+ ⊂ F
B,W,µ
t , we conclude that
Pn(τ ≤ s|F
B,W,µ
T ) = Pn(τ ≤ s|F
B,W,µ
t ). (6.1)
Since Pn(τ = 0) = 0, we also have (6.1) for s = 0. Since (6.1) holds for all s ∈ [0, t], we conclude
that Fτt+ = σ{{τ ≤ s} : s ≤ t} is independent of F
B,W,µ
T given F
B,W,µ
t under Pn, for t ∈ (0, T ).
To conclude that Pn ∈ R(ρ), we must still check that F
τ
0 is conditionally independent of F
B,W,µ
T
given FB,W,µ0 under Pn. But this is obvious, as F
τ
0 = σ{τ ∧ 0} is the trivial σ-field.
R(ρ) is convex: To check that R(ρ) is convex, note that R(ρ) is the set of P ∈ P(Ωinput×
[0, T ]) with first marginal ρ for which
E
P [φt(τ)ψ(B,W,µ)ψt(B,W,µ)] = E
P
[
E
P
[
φt(τ)| F
B,W,µ
t
]
ψ(B,W,µ)ψt(B,W,µ)
]
,
for every t ∈ [0, T ] and every triple of bounded functions φt, ψ, and ψt, measurable with respect
to Fτt , F
B,W,µ
T , and F
B,W,µ
t , respectively. Disintegrate any P ∈ R(ρ) by writing P (dω, ds) =
ρ(dω)P (ω, ds), and note that the above equation is equivalent to∫
Ωinput×[0,T ]
P (dω, du)ψ(ω)ψt(ω)φt(u) =
∫
Ωinput
ρ(dω)ψ(ω)ψt(ω)
∫
[0,T ]
P (ω, du)φt(u).
This is clearly a convex constraint on P , and we conclude that R(ρ) is convex.
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R
+(ρ) is contained in the closure of R0(ρ): Let P ∈ R
+(ρ), and consider the process
Ht = 1{τ≤t} defined on Ωinput×[0, T ]. Note thatH is F
τ
+-adapted, because {Ht = 1} = {τ ≤ t} ∈
Fτt+. As a first approximation, note that the ca`dla`g process H
n
t = 1{(τ+1/n)∧T≤t} is F
τ -adapted
and converges almost surely to H in the Skorohod topology. Because Φ(Hn) = (τ +1/n)∧T →
τ = Φ(H) a.s. by Lemma 6.6, we may henceforth assume that H is in fact Fτ -adapted.
Next, by a routine approximation we may find a sequence of ca`dla`g Fτ -adapted processes
Hn converging almost surely to H and of the form
Hnt =
K∑
k=1
hnk1[tn
k
,tn
k+1
)(t),
where 0 < tn1 < t
n
2 < . . . < t
n
K = T < t
n
K+1, and where h
n
k ≥ 0 is an F
τ
tn
k
-measurable random
variables. Replacing hnk by maxj=1,...,k h
n
j does not change the value of Φ(H
n), which again
converges almost surely to Φ(H) = τ by Lemma 6.6, which applies because H ∈ S a.s. As
a final approximation, let Ĥnt = H
n
t + t/n; this last approximation accounts for the fact that
Hn may not belong a.s. to S, while Ĥ does. Note that |Hnt − Ĥ
n
t | → 0 uniformly in t, so
limnΦ(Ĥ
n) = limnΦ(H
n) = τ . With these approximations, we may then assume henceforth
that H itself is increasing and of the form
Ht =
K∑
k=1
hk1[tk,tk+1)(t) +
t
n
,
where 0 < t1 < t2 < . . . < tK = T < tK+1, and where hk is F
τ
tk
-measurable for each k.
Now define St for t ∈ [0, T ] by
St = (B·∧t,W·∧t, µ
t),
where mt was defined just before the start of the proof. Then S = (St)t∈[0,T ] is a continuous
F
B,W,µ-adapted process, with values in Ωinput. In fact, F
B,W,µ
t = σ(St) = σ(S·∧t) for every t. For
every k = 1, . . . ,K, note that (h1, . . . , hk) is conditionally independent of S given S·∧tk . It follows
from Proposition 6.2 that there exists a sequence of continuous functions gnk : Ωinput → R+ such
that gnk (S) is σ(Stk) = F
B,W,µ
tk
-measurable for each k and
(S, gn1 (S), . . . , g
n
K(S))⇒ (S, h1, . . . , hK), in Ωinput × R
K
+ , as n→∞.
Now define
Hnt = H
n
t (S) =
K∑
k=1
gnk (S)1[tk ,tk+1)(t) +
t
n
.
It follows that (S,Hn) ⇒ (S,H), and because H belongs almost surely to the set S of Lemma
6.6 we have (S,Φ(Hn))⇒ (S,Φ(H)) = (S, τ). Now let g˜nk (s) = maxj=1,...,k g
n
j (s), and define
H˜nt = H˜
n
t (S) =
K∑
k=1
g˜nk (S)1[tk ,tk+1)(t).
Then Φ(H˜n) = Φ(Hn) almost surely, so again we have (S,Φ(H˜n)) ⇒ (S, τ). Now, because
each g˜nk is continuous, we may view H˜(·) as a continuous map from Ωinput to the subset S of
D defined in Lemma 6.6. Hence, Lemma 6.6 ensures that Φ(H˜n(·)) is a continuous map from
Ωinput to [0, T ]. The law of (S,Φ(H˜
n)) thus belongs to R0(ρ). 
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Proof of Proposition 4.3. With Corollary 6.5 in hand, we are now ready to prove Proposition
4.3. It is readily checked that P satisfies property (2) of Definition 4.2 of a weak MFE. As τ∗ is
a FB,W -stopping time, Fτt+ is contained in the P -completion of F
B,W,µ
t , and the compatibility
property (3) holds easily (noting that compatibility is not sensitive to the completion of filtra-
tions). To prove (1) is slightly more involved: Clearly P ◦ (B,W )−1 = W2, where as usual W
denotes Wiener measure. Note also that if gt : C → R is bounded and F
B,W
t -measurable, then
E[gt(B,W )|B] =
∫
C
gt(B,w)W(dw) = E[gt(B,W )|F
B
t ], a.s.
Thus, since τ is a.s. (B,W )-measurable, if t ∈ [0, T ] and C ∈ FW,τt then
µ(C) = P ((W, τ) ∈ C|B) = P ((W, τ) ∈ C|FBt ), P − a.s.
This shows that (the completion of) Fµt is contained in (the completion of) F
B
t . Hence, under P ,
the completion of FB,W,µ,τt is contained in that of F
B,W
t , which proves property (1). The weak
fixed point condition (5) holds because µ is B-measurable. Finally, the optimality condition (4)
follows from Corollary 6.5. 
6.2. A shortcut to compatibility. As a final preparatory step, before proving the main results
we state one last useful lemma. It allows us to check a much simpler criterion in place of the
compatibility property (3) of Definition 4.2, which does not behave too well under limits. In
fact, this lemma is precisely the reason we work with the conditional joint law of (W, τ) and not
just τ itself.
Lemma 6.7. Suppose P ∈ P(Ω) satisfies properties (2) and (5) of Definition 4.2. Suppose also
that FB,µT ∨F
W,τ
t is independent of σ{Ws−Wt : s ∈ [t, T ]}, for every t ∈ [0, T ). Then P satisfies
property (3) of Definition 4.2; that is, Fτt+ is conditionally independent of F
B,W,µ
T given F
B,W,µ
t+ ,
for every t ∈ [0, T ].
Proof. According to the final claim of Theorem 6.4, it suffices to check that Fτt is conditionally
independent of FB,W,µT given F
B,W,µ
t , for every t ∈ [0, T ]. Fix bounded functions ft, gT , gt,
h+, and ht, such that ft(τ) is F
τ
t -measurable, gT (B,µ) is F
B,µ
T -measurable, gt(B,µ) is F
B,µ
t -
measurable, h+(W ) is σ{Ws − Wt : s ∈ [t, T ]}-measurable, and ht(W ) is F
W
t -measurable.
Compute
E
[
ft(τ)gT (B,µ)gt(B,µ)h
+(W )ht(W )
]
= E [ft(τ)gT (B,µ)gt(B,µ)ht(W )]E[h
+(W )]
= E
[
gt(B,µ)gT (B,µ)
∫
ft(s)ht(w)µ(dw, ds)
]
E[h+(W )]
= E
[
gt(B,µ)E
[
gT (B,µ)| F
B,µ
t
] ∫
ft(s)ht(w)µ(dw, ds)
]
E[h+(W )]
= E
[
gt(B,µ)ht(W )ft(τ)E
[
gT (B,µ)| F
B,µ
t
]]
E[h+(W )]
= E
[
gt(B,µ)ht(W )ft(τ)E
[
gT (B,µ)h
+(W )
∣∣FB,W,µt ]] .
The first step used the assumed independence, whereas the second and fourth used the fixed point
property µ = P ((W, τ) ∈ ·|B,µ). The third step used the fact that
∫
φdµ is Fµt -measurable (and
thus FB,µt -measurable) for every bounded F
W,τ
t -measurable function φ on C × [0, T ]. Finally,
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the last step used the easy identity
E
[
gT (B,µ)h
+(W )
∣∣FB,W,µt ] = E [gT (B,µ)| FB,µt ]E[h+(W )].

7. Proofs of limit theorems
This section is devoted to the proofs of Theorems 4.4 and 4.5. At this point it may be useful
to recall the notations in these theorems. In particular, take care to distinguish the empirical
measure of stopping times µ(~τ n), defined in (3.1), from the joint empirical measure µ̂(~τ n),
defined in (4.3).
7.1. Proof of Theorem 4.4. Abbreviate µ̂n = µ̂n(~τ n). Note first that P◦(B,W k)−1 =W2 for
all k, so the C2-marginal of Pn does not depend on n. Clearly, the [0, T ]-marginal sequence (Pn ◦
τ−1)∞n=1 is tight because [0, T ] is compact. To show that the marginal sequence (Pn ◦(µ̂
n)−1)∞n=1
is tight, it suffices to show that the sequence of mean measures EPn [µ̂n(·)] ∈ P(W × [0, T ]) is
tight (c.f. the proof of [34, Proposition 2.2]). But this follows from the observation that the
first marginal of EPn [µ̂n(·)] is the Wiener measure for each n. As each of marginal sequences is
tight, the sequence (Pn)
∞
n=1 ⊂ P(Ω) is tight. Let P be any limit point of Pn, and relabel the
subsequence to assume Pn → P . We check that P satisfies the five defining properties of a weak
MFE.
Proof of (1): First, note that
P ◦ (B,W )−1 = lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
k=1
P ◦ (B,W k)−1 =W2.
We next prove that (B,W ) is a Wiener process with respect to FB,W,µ,τ+ , or equivalently with
respect to FB,W,µ,τ . Fix t ∈ [0, T ). Let ft, gt, ht, and h
+ be bounded continuous functions on
[0, T ], P(C × [0, T ]), C2, and C2, respectively. Assume ft is F
τ
t -measurable, gt is F
µ
t -measurable,
ht is F
B,W
t -measurable, and h
+ is σ{(Bs−Bt,Ws−Wt) : s ∈ [t, T ]}-measurable. Then, because
(B,W 1, . . . ,W n) are FB,W
1,...,Wn
+ -Wiener processes,
E
P
[
ft(τ)gt(µ)ht(B,W )h
+(B,W )
]
= lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
E
P
[
ft(τ
n
i )gt(µ̂
n)ht(B,W
i)h+(B,W i)
]
= lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
E
P
[
ft(τ
n
i )gt(µ̂
n)ht(B,W
i)
]
E
P
[
h+(B,W i)
]
= EP [ft(τ)gt(µ)ht(B,W )]E
P
[
h+(B,W )
]
.
This shows that σ{(Bs −Bt,Ws −Wt) : s ∈ [t, T ]} is independent of F
B,W,µ,τ
t , under P .
Proof of (2): To show that (B,µ) and W are independent under P is straightforward: For
bounded continuous functions f : C×P(C × [0, T ])→ R and g : C → R, the law of large numbers
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yields
E
P [f(B,µ)g(W )]− EP [f(B,µ)]]EP [g(W )]
= lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
E
P
[
f(B, µ̂n)g(W i)
]
− EP [f(B, µ̂n)]
1
n
n∑
i=1
E
P
[
g(W i)
]
= lim
n→∞
E
P
[
f(B, µ̂n)
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
g(W i)−
∫
g dW
)]
= 0,
since W i are i.i.d. with law W under P.
Proof of (5): The proof of the fixed point condition (5) is also straightforward. Let f and
g be bounded continuous functions on C × P(C × [0, T ]) and C × [0, T ], respectively, and notice
that
E
P [f(B,µ)g(W, τ)] = lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
E
P
[
f(B, µ̂n)g(W i, τni )
]
= lim
n→∞
E
P
[
f(B, µ̂n)
∫
g dµ̂n
]
= EP
[
f(B,µ)
∫
g dµ
]
.
Proof of (3): Because we have established properties (2) and (5), Lemma 6.7 will imme-
diately yield (3) once we can show that FB,µT ∨ F
W,τ
t is independent of σ{Ws −Wt : s ∈ [t, T ]},
for every t ∈ [0, T ). Fix t ∈ [0, T ). Fix bounded continuous functions f on C × P(C × [0, T ]), gt
on [0, T ], ht on C, and h
+ on C. Assume f is uniformly continuous (thus FB,µT -measurable), g is
Fτt -measurable, ht is F
W
t -measurable, and h
+ is σ{Ws −Wt : s ∈ [t, T ]}-measurable. Define
µ̂n,−i :=
1
n− 1
∑
k 6=i
δ(W k,τn
k
) =
n
n− 1
µ̂n −
1
n− 1
δ(W k ,τn
k
),
and note that ‖µ̂n,−i − µ̂n‖TV ≤ 2/(n − 1) a.s. The total variation topology is finer than weak
convegence, and so
|f(B, µ̂n)− f(B, µ̂n,−i)| → 0,
in L∞, uniformly in i. Now, since σ{W is −W
i
t : s ∈ [t, T ]} is independent of F
W i
t ∨ F
B,(W k)k 6=i
T ,
we have
E
P
[
f(B,µ)gt(τ)ht(W )h
+(W )
]
= lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
E
P
[
f(B, µ̂n)gt(τ
n
i )ht(W
i)h+(W i)
]
= lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
E
P
[
f(B, µ̂n,−i)gt(τ
n
i )ht(W
i)h+(W i)
]
= lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
E
P
[
f(B, µ̂n,−i)gt(τ
n
i )ht(W
i)
]
E
P[h+(W i)]
= lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
E
P
[
f(B, µ̂n)gt(τ
n
i )ht(W
i)
]
E
P[h+(W i)]
= EP [f(B,µ)gt(τ)ht(W )]E
P [h+(W )].
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This implies FB,µT ∨ F
W,τ
t is independent of σ{Ws −Wt : s ∈ [t, T ]}, under P .
Proof of (4): It remains to prove that the optimality condition holds in the limit. Recall
that µτ (·) = µ(C × ·) denotes the [0, T ]-marginal of µ. By Corollary 6.5, it suffices to show
E
P [F (B,W,µτ , τ)] ≥ EP [F (B,W,µτ , σ)]
for every FB,W,µ-stopping time σ on Ω of the form σ = σˆ(B,W,µ), where σˆ : C2×P(C× [0, T ])→
[0, T ] is continuous. Fix such a stopping time. For the n-player game define
σi = σˆ(B,W
i, µ̂n(~τ n)).
Then σi is a F
B,W 1,...,Wn-stopping time. Recall that µn denotes the [0, T ]-marginal of the joint
empirical measure µ̂n. The Nash property implies
E
P [F (B,W,µ, τ)] = lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
E
P
[
F (B,W i, µn(~τ n), τni )
]
≥ lim sup
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
E
P
[
F (B,W i, µn(~τ n,−i, σi), σi)
]
= lim sup
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
E
P
[
F (B,W i, µn(~τ n), σˆ(B,W i, µ̂n(~τ n)))
]
= EP [F (B,W,µτ , σˆ(B,W,µ))].
Indeed, the equality in the third line follows from the easy estimate ‖µn(~τ n,−i, σi)−µ
n(~τ n)‖TV ≤
2/n, where ‖m‖TV = sup|f |≤1
∫
f dm denotes total variation, and also from the continuity of
F = F (b, w,m, t) in m ensured by assumption D. Both the first and last lines use Lemma 6.1
to deal with the potential discontinuity of F in (B,W ), with the last step using crucially the
continuity of σˆ. 
7.2. Proof of Theorem 4.5. Let P ∈ P(Ω) be a weak MFE. Construct, on some alternative
probability space (Ω˜, F˜ , P˜), a C×P(C×[0, T ])-valued random variable (B,µ) with law P◦(B,µ)−1
and a sequence of random variables (W i, τ i), which are conditionally independent given (B,µ)
and have common conditional law µ. There is some abuse of notation here, as (B,µ) is used
both for the new random variable and for the random variable defined on the canonical space
Ω, but this should cause no confusion as we work exclusively on (Ω˜, F˜ , P˜) in this proof.
The law of (B,µ,W i, τ i) is precisely P , for each i. As usual, let ~τ n = (τ1, . . . , τn), and for
t1, . . . , tn ∈ [0, T ] define the empirical measures (now on Ω˜)
µn(t1, . . . , tn) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
δti , µ̂
n(t1, . . . , tn) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
δ(W i,ti).
Define
ǫn :=
{
sup
σ∈Sn
E
[
F (B,W 1, µn(~τ n,−1, σ), σ)
]
− E
[
F (B,W 1, µn(~τ n), τ1)
]}+
,
where Sn is the set of F
B,W 1,...,Wn-stopping times (defined on Ω˜). By symmetry
sup
σ∈Sn
E
[
F (B,W k, µn(~τ n,−k, σ), σ)
]
≤ ǫn + E
[
F (B,W k, µn(~τ n), τk)
]
, (7.1)
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for every k = 1, . . . , n. We first show that ǫn → 0. Indeed,
ǫn ≤ E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
∣∣F (B,W 1, µn(~τ n,−1, t), t)− F (B,W 1, µ, t)∣∣]
+
{
sup
σ∈S∞
E
[
F (B,W 1, µ, σ)
]
− E
[
F (B,W 1, µn(~τ n), τ1)
]}+
,
where S∞ = ∪n≥1Sn. We claim that the term on the first line converges to zero. Indeed,
‖µn(~τ n,−1, t) − µn(~τ n)‖ ≤ 2/n, and µn(~τ n) → µ weakly a.s. by the (conditional) law of large
numbers. Conclude using the assumption that P([0, T ]) × [0, T ]) ∋ (m, t) 7→ F (b, w,m, t) is
(uniformly) continuous for each fixed (b, w). The second term also tends to zero, because
E
[
F (B,W 1, µn(~τ n), τ1)
]
→ E
[
F (B,W 1, µ, τ1)
]
≥ sup
σ∈S∞
E
[
F (B,W 1, µ, σ)
]
.
Indeed, to prove the last inequality, note that for any σ ∈ S∞ we can easily check that F
σ
t is
conditionally independent of FB,W
1,µ
T given F
B,W 1,µ
t , for every t. Because (B,W
1, µ, τ1) has
law P , which is a weak MFE, the optimality condition (4) of Definition 4.2 provides the desired
inequality.
It may appear that we have shown that (τ1, . . . , τn) form an ǫn-Nash equilibrium for the
n-player game, with ǫn → 0, but this is not accurate. The stopping times τ
i are not stopping
times relative to FB,W
1,...,Wn , but rather to a larger filtration. This necessitates one more
approximation, using a straightforward extension of Theorem 6.4 to deal with vectors of stopping
times as opposed to single stopping times; the proof of this extension is exactly the same but
notationally more cumbersome. Note that Fτ
1,...,τn
t is conditionally independent of F
B,W 1,...,Wn
T
given FB,W
1,...,Wn,µ
t , for every t, simply because (B,W
1, . . . ,W n) is a FB,W
1,...,Wn,τ1,...,τn-Wiener
process. Hence, using the aforementioned extension of Theorem 6.4, we may find FB,W
1,...,Wn-
stopping times, τ1k , . . . , τ
n
k , such that
(B,W 1, . . . ,W n, τ1k , . . . , τ
n
k )⇒ (B,W
1, . . . ,W n, τ1, . . . , τn),
as k →∞. Let ~τ n,k = (τ1k , . . . , τ
n
k ), and define
ǫkn := max
i=1,...,n
{
sup
σ∈Sn
E
[
F (B,W i, µn(~τ n,k,−i, σ), σ)
]
− E
[
F (B,W i, µn(~τ n,k), τ ik)
]}+
.
For a fixed n, we can argue that limk→∞ ǫ
k
n = ǫn. Indeed, this follows from the observation that
lim
k→∞
max
i=1,...,n
∣∣∣E [F (B,W i, µn(~τ n,k), τ ik)]− E [F (B,W i, µn(~τ n), τ i)]∣∣∣ = 0,
by construction, and
lim
k→∞
max
i=1,...,n
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
∣∣∣F (B,W i, µn(~τ n,k,−i, t), t)− F (B,W i, µn(~τ n,−i, t), t)∣∣∣] = 0,
because m 7→ F (b, w,m, t) is continuous in m, uniformly in t, for almost every fixed (b, w).
In summary, we may find kn →∞ such that
1
n
n∑
i=1
Law(B,W i, µ̂n(~τ n,kn), τ ikn)→ Law(B,W
1, µ, τ1),
as well as ǫknn ↓ 0 and
max
i=1,...,n
sup
σ∈Sn
E
[
F (B,W i, µn(~τ n,kn,−i, σ), σ)
]
≤ E
[
F (B,W i, µn(~τ n,kn), τ ikn)
]
+ ǫknn .
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8. Existence under continuity assumption D
This section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 4.6. First, we prove existence of a weak
MFE (more precisely, a strong MFE with weak stopping time) in the case that the time set and
the common noise range space are finite. Then, we take weak limits. We introduce the following
discretization.
For each positive integer n, let tni = i2
−nT for i = 0, . . . , 2n. Choose partitions πn of R into
n measurable sets of strictly positive Lebesgue measure, in such a way that πn+1 is a refinement
of πn for each n and the union ∪n≥1π
n generates the entire Borel σ-field. We will define a
sub-filtration of FB according to which sets of πn contains the increments Btn
i+1
−Btn
i
. Precisely,
define the σ-field
Gntn
k
= σ
{
{Btn
i
−Btn
i−1
∈ C} : C ∈ πn, i = 1, . . . , k
}
, for k = 1, . . . , 2n,
Gn0 = σ{{B0 ∈ C} : C ∈ π
n}.
Additionally, for t ∈ [0, T ], define ⌊t⌋n = max{t
n
k : k = 0, . . . , 2
n, tnk ≤ t}, and let G
n
t = G
n
⌊t⌋n
.
Then Gn = (Gnt )t∈[0,T ] defines a filtration, and G
n
t is finite for each n, t. Moreover,
FBt = σ
(
∞⋃
n=1
Gnt
)
, for t ∈ [0, T ].
By construction, W(C) > 0 for every nonempty set C ∈ GnT .
Let Mn denote the set of functions m : C → P([0, T ]) such that, for each t ∈ [0, T ] the map
b 7→ m(b)[0, t] is Gnt -measurable. Of course, since G
n
T is finite, a map m ∈ Mn must be constant
on each atom of GnT . Endowed with the topology of pointwise convergence, Mn is easily seen to
be compact, because P([0, T ]) is compact. Lastly, define A as the set of probability measures
Q ∈ P(C2 × [0, T ]) under which B and W are independent FB,W,τ -Wiener processes.
Theorem 8.1. For each n, there exist m ∈Mn and Q ∈ A satisfying the following:
(1) m(B) = Q(τ ∈ ·|GnT ).
(2) The optimality condition holds,
E
Q[F (B,W,m(B), τ)] ≥ sup
Q′∈A
E
Q′[F (B,W,m(B), τ)]
Proof. It follows from Theorem 6.4 that A is compact and convex; see Remark 6.3. Define a
map Φn from Mn to subsets of A by
Φn(m) = argmax
Q∈A
E
Q[F (B,W,m(B), τ)].
The map (m,Q) 7→ EQ[F (B,W,m(B), τ)] is jointly continuous on Mn ×A, thanks to Lemma
6.1 and continuity of F = F (b, w,m, t) in (m, t). Thus, by Berge’s theorem [4, Theorem 17.31],
Φn has closed graph and takes nonempty convex values. Define a map Ψn :Mn → 2
Mn by
Ψn(m) = {Q(τ ∈ ·|G
n
T ) : Q ∈ Φn(m)} .
Because Q ◦B−1 =W, for continuous bounded functions f : [0, T ]→ R we may write
E
Q[f(τ)|GnT ](b) =
∑
C
E
Q[f(τ)1{B∈C}]
W(C)
1C(b), for b ∈ C,
where the sum is over atoms of GnT . For each such atom C, note that W(C) > 0, and the map
Q 7→ EQ[f(τ)1{B∈C}] is continuous on A by Lemma 6.1. We may thus view Q 7→ Q(τ ∈ ·|G
n
T )
as a continuous affine map from A toMn. Hence, the set-valued map Ψn has closed graph, and
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its values are nonempty, convex, and compact. By Kakutani’s theorem [4, Corollary 17.55], it
admits a fixed point; that is, there exists m ∈ Mn such that m ∈ Ψn(m). 
Proof of Theorem 4.6. For each n, let mn ∈ Mn and Qn ∈ A satisfy properties (1-2) of
Theorem 8.1. Define m̂n : C → P(C × [0, T ]) by
m̂n(B) = Qn((W, τ) ∈ ·|G
n
T ).
We note here that if C ∈ FW,τt for t ∈ [0, T ], then we have
m̂n(B) = Qn((W, τ) ∈ ·|G
n
⌈t⌉n
), (8.1)
where ⌈t⌉n = min{t
n
k : k = 0, . . . , 2
n, tnk ≥ t}. Indeed, this holds because B is an F
B,W,τ -Wiener
process under Qn, and because G
n
T is generated by G
n
⌈t⌉n
and the events {Btn
i
− Btn
i−1
∈ C ′} for
C ′ ∈ πn and for tni−1 ≥ t.
Next, define Pn ∈ P(Ω) by
Pn = Qn ◦ (B,W, m̂n(B), τ)
−1.
We claim that (Pn)
∞
n=1 is tight and that every limit point is a weak MFE in the sense of
Definition 4.2. We begin with tightness, by showing that each marginal is tight. Note that the
first marginal Pn ◦ (B,W )
−1 =W2 is clearly tight, as it is constant. Moreover, Pn ◦ τ
−1 is tight
because [0, T ] is compact. To prove that Pn ◦ µ
−1 is tight, it suffices to show that the mean
measures EPn [µ(·)] are tight (c.f. the proof of [34, Proposition 2.2]). But, for any measurable
set C ⊂ C × [0, T ],
E
Pn [µ(C)] = EQn[m̂n(B)(C)] = E
Qn [Qn((W, τ) ∈ C|G
n
T )] = Qn((W, τ) ∈ C) = Pn((W, τ) ∈ C).
That is, the mean measure EPn [µ(·)] is precisely Pn ◦ (W, τ)
−1, which we already observed to be
tight.
With tightness of (Pn)
∞
n=1 established, fix a limit point P and abuse notation by assuming
Pn → P . We will show that P is a weak MFE by checking the five properties of Definition 4.2:
Proof of (1): Clearly P ◦ (B,W )−1 = limn→∞Qn ◦ (B,W )
−1 = W2. We must show that
(B,W ) are FB,W,µ,τ -Wiener processes under P . Fix N and fix t ∈ {tN0 , . . . , t
N
2N−1
}. Let ft, gt,
ht, and h
+ be bounded continuous functions on [0, T ], P(C × [0, T ]), C2, and C2, respectively.
Assume ft is F
τ
t -measurable, gt is F
µ
t -measurable, ht is F
B,W
t -measurable, and h
+ is σ{(Bs −
Bt,Ws −Wt) : s ∈ [t, T ]}-measurable. Since ⌈t⌉n = t for n ≥ N and G
n
t ⊂ F
B
t , it follows from
(8.1) that the map b 7→ m̂n(b)(C) is F
B
t -measurable for every C ∈ F
W,τ
t . This implies m̂n is
FBt /F
µ
t -measurable and, in particular, gt(m̂n(B)) is F
B
t -measurable. Thus, since (B,W ) is an
F
B,W,τ -Wiener process under Qn,
E
P [ft(τ)gt(µ)ht(B,W )h
+(B,W )] = lim
n→∞
E
Qn[ft(τ)gt(m̂n(B))ht(B,W )h
+(B,W )]
= lim
n→∞
E
Qn[ft(τ)gt(m̂n(B))ht(B,W )]E
Qn [h+(B,W )]
= EP [ft(τ)gt(µ)ht(B,W )]E
P [h+(B,W )].
This is enough to conclude that σ{(Bs − Bt,Ws −Wt) : s ∈ [t, T ]} is independent of F
B,W,µ,τ
t ,
under P . We have only shown this to be true for t ∈ ∪∞N=1{t
N
0 , . . . , t
N
2N−1
}, but this it suffices
to note that this set is dense in [0, T ].
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Proof of (2): Because B and W are independent under Qn, for bounded continuous func-
tions f on C × P(C × [0, T ]) and g on C we have
E
P [f(B,µ)g(W )] = lim
n→∞
E
Qn [f(B, m̂(B))g(W )]
= lim
n→∞
E
Qn [f(B, m̂(B))]EQn [g(W )]
= EP [f(B,µ)]EP [g(W )].
Thus (B,µ) and W are independent under P .
Proof of (5): Fix N ≥ 1, and let f be a bounded GNT measurable function on C. Let g and
h be continuous bounded functions on C × [0, T ] and P(C × [0, T ]), respectively. Noting that f
is GnT -measurable for all n ≥ N , and using Lemma 6.1 to deal with the discontinuity of f in b,
we have
E
P [f(B)h(µ)g(W, τ)] = lim
n→∞
E
Qn [f(B)h(m̂n(B))g(W, τ)]
= lim
n→∞
E
Qn
[
f(B)h(m̂n(B))
∫
g dm̂n(B)
]
= EP
[
f(B)h(µ)
∫
g dµ
]
.
This holds for each N and each GNT -measurable f . Since F
B
T = σ(∪n≥1G
N
T ), the same identity
must hold for every FBT -measurable f .
Proof of (3): Because we have established properties (2) and (5), Lemma 6.7 will yield
(3) once we can show that FB,µT ∨ F
W,τ
t is independent of σ{Ws −Wt : s ∈ [t, T ]}, for every
t ∈ [0, T ). Fix t ∈ [0, T ). Fix bounded continuous functions f on C × P(C × [0, T ]), gt on
[0, T ], ht on C, and h
+ on C. Assume g is Fτt -measurable, ht is F
W
t -measurable, and h
+ is
σ{Ws −Wt : s ∈ [t, T ]}-measurable. Under Qn, (B,W ) is a standard F
B,W,τ -Wiener process,
and it follows easily that h+(W ) is independent of FBT ∨ F
W,τ
t . Thus,
E
P
[
f(B,µ)gt(τ)ht(W )h
+(W )
]
= lim
n→∞
E
Qn
[
f(B, m̂n(B))gt(τ)ht(W )h
+(W )
]
= lim
n→∞
E
Qn [f(B, m̂n(B))gt(τ)ht(W )]E
Qn [h+(W )]
= EP [f(B,µ)gt(τ)ht(W )]E
P [h+(W )].
This shows FB,µT ∨ F
W,τ
t is independent of σ{Ws −Wt : s ∈ [t, T ]}, under P .
Proof of (4): By Corollary 6.5, it suffices to show
E
P [F (B,W,µτ , τ)] ≥ EP [F (B,W,µτ , σ)]
for every FB,W,µ-stopping time σ of the form σ = σˆ(B,W,µ), where σˆ : C2×P(C×[0, T ])→ [0, T ]
is continuous. Fix such a stopping time. Using the continuity of σˆ, and using Lemma 6.1 to
handle the discontinuity of F in (B,W ), we have
E
P [F (B,W,µτ , τ)]− EP [F (B,W,µτ , σ)]
= lim
n→∞
E
Qn [F (B,W,mn(B), τ)]− E
Qn [F (B,W,mn(B), σ(B,W, m̂n(B)))]
≥ 0,
where we have finally used the optimality property of mn from Theorem 8.1. Indeed, the law
Q′n := Qn ◦ (B,W, σ(B,W, m̂n(B)))
−1
is easily seen to belong to A, by noting that (as we saw in the proof of (1)) m̂n is adapted in
the sense that b 7→ m̂n(b)(C) is F
B
t -measurable for C ∈ F
W,τ
t . 
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Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 6.2
To prove Theorem 6.2, we need a preliminary results, borrowed from previous works of the
authors. Recall that ⇒ denotes convergence in law.
Proposition A.1 (Proposition C.1 of [12]). Let X and Y be random variables defined on a
common probability space, taking values in some Polish spaces E and F . If the law of X is
nonatomic, and if F is (homeomorphic to) a convex subset of a locally convex space, then there
exists a sequence of continuous functions φn : E → F such that (X,φn(X))⇒ (X,Y ).
Proposition 6.2 extends Proposition A.1 to the dynamic setting, and this is where the role of
compatibility is the clearest. This is contained in the third author’s PhD thesis [27, Proposition
2.1.6], which itself was implicitly present in the proof of [12, Lemma 3.11], though we include
the proof for the sake of completeness.
Proof of Proposition 6.2. The proof is an inductive application of Proposition A.1. First,
in light of the assumption that the law of Y1 is nonatomic, Proposition A.1 allows us to find a
sequence of continuous functions hj1 : Y → X such that (Y1, h
j
1(Y1))⇒ (Y1,X1) as j →∞. Let us
show that in fact (Z, hj1(Y1)) converges to (Z,X1). Let φ : Z → R be bounded and measurable,
and let ψ : X → R be continuous. Note that Z and X1 are conditionally independent given Y1,
by assumption. Now use Lemma 6.1 to get
lim
j→∞
E[φ(Z)ψ(hj1(Y1))] = limj→∞
E
[
E [φ(Z)|Y1]ψ(h
j
1(Y1))
]
= E [E [φ(Z)|Y1])ψ(X1)]
= E [E [φ(Z)|Y1]E [ψ(X1)|Y1]]
= E [E [φ(Z)ψ(X1)|Y1]]
= E [φ(Z)ψ(X1)] .
The class of functions of the form Z×X ∋ (z, x) 7→ φ(z)ψ(x), where φ and ψ are as above, is con-
vergence determining (see, e.g., [15, Proposition 3.4.6(b)]), and we conclude that (Z, hj1(Y1))⇒
(Z,X1).
We proceed inductively as follows. Abbreviate Y n := (Z1, . . . , Zn) for each n = 1, . . . , N ,
noting Y N = Y , and similarly define Xn. Suppose we are given 1 ≤ n < N and continuous
functions gjk : Y
k → X , for k ∈ {1, . . . , n} and j ≥ 1, satisfying
lim
j→∞
(Z, gj1(Y
1), . . . , gjn(Y
n)) = (Z,Xn), (A.1)
where convergence is in distribution, as usual. We will show that there exist continuous functions
hik : Y
k → X for each k ∈ {1, . . . , n+ 1} and i ≥ 1 such that
lim
i→∞
(Z, hi1(Y
1), . . . , hin+1(Y
n+1)) = (Z,X1, . . . ,Xn+1). (A.2)
By Proposition A.1 there exists a sequence of continuous functions gˆj : (Yn+1 ×X n)→ X such
that
lim
j→∞
(Y n+1,Xn, gˆj(Y n+1,Xn)) = (Y n+1,Xn,Xn+1) = (Y
n+1,Xn+1). (A.3)
We claim now that
lim
j→∞
(Z,Xn, gˆj(Y n+1,Xn)) = (Z,Xn,Xn+1). (A.4)
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Indeed, let φ, ψn, and ψ be bounded measurable functions on Z, X
n, and X , respectively, with
ψn and ψ continuous. Use the conditional independence of Z and (Y
n+1,Xn+1) given Y n+1
along with (A.3) and Lemma 6.1 to get
lim
j→∞
E[φ(Z)ψn(X
n)ψ(gˆj(Y n+1,Xn))] = lim
j→∞
E
[
E
[
φ(Z)|Y n+1
]
ψn(X
n)ψ(gˆj(Y n+1,Xn))
]
= E
[
E
[
φ(Z)|Y n+1
]
ψn(X
n)ψ(Xn+1)
]
= E
[
E
[
φ(Z)|Y n+1
]
E
[
ψn(X
n)ψ(Xn+1)|Y
n+1
]]
= E
[
E
[
φ(Z)ψn(X
n)ψ(Xn+1)|Y
n+1
]]
= E [φ(Z)ψn(X
n)ψ(Xn+1)] .
Again, the class of functions of the form Z × X n × X ∋ (z, x, x′) 7→ φ(z)ψn(x)ψ(x
′), where φ,
ψn, and ψ are as above, is convergence determining, and (A.4) follows.
By continuity of gˆj , the limit (A.1) implies that, for each j,
lim
k→∞
(Z, gk1 (Y
1), . . . , gkn(Y
n), gˆj(Y n+1, gk1 (Y
1), . . . , gkn(Y
n)))
= (Z,X1, . . . ,Xn, gˆ
j(Y n+1,X1, . . . ,Xn))
= (Z,Xn, gˆj(Y n+1,Xn)). (A.5)
Combining the two limits (A.4) and (A.5), we may find a subsequence jk such that
lim
k→∞
(Z, gjk1 (Y
1), . . . , gjkn (Y
n), gˆk(Y n+1, gjk1 (Y
1), . . . , gjkn (Y
n))) = (Z,Xn,Xn+1).
Define hkℓ := h
jk
ℓ for ℓ = 1, . . . , n and h
k
n+1(Y
n+1) := gˆk(Y n+1, gjk1 (Y
1), . . . , gjkn (Y n)) to complete
the induction. 
Appendix B. The lattice of stopping times
In this section, we prove that the set S of stopping times defined in Section 5 is a complete
lattice. Recall that S is defined as the set of (equivalence classes of a.s. equal) random times
τ defined on the probability space Ωcom × Ωind, which are stopping times with respect to the
filtration Fsig. Recall that the essential supremum of a family Φ of random variables is defined
as the minimal (with respect to a.s. order) random variable exceeding a.s. each element of T:
Theorem B.1 (Theorem A.33 of [16]). Let Φ be a set of real-valued random variables. Then
there exists a unique (up to a.s. equality) random variable Z = ess supΦ such that Z ≥ X a.s.
for each X ∈ Φ, and also Z ≤ Y a.s. for every random variable Y satisfying Y ≥ X a.s. for
every X ∈ Φ. Moreover, there exists a countable set Φ0 ⊂ Φ such that Z = supX∈Φ0 X a.s.
Proof. Existence and uniqueness is stated in [16, Theorem A.33], and the proof therein constructs
the desired Φ0. 
The essential infimum is defined analogously, or simply by ess inf Φ = − ess sup(−Φ).
Theorem B.2. The set S is a complete lattice.
Proof. Fix a set Φ ⊂ S. Define Z = ess supΦ and find a countable set {τn : n ≥ 1} ⊂ Φ
such that Z = supn τn a.s. Define σn = maxk=1,...,n τk, so that σn is an increasing sequence of
stopping times with σn ↑ Z a.s. The increasing limit of a sequence of stopping times is again a
stopping time [13, Theorem IV.55(b)], so Z ∈ S.
A similar argument applies to show that the essential infimum of Φ is also a stopping time,
and the only difference is that this step crucially uses the right-continuity of the filtration
F
sig
; indeed, while the supremum of a sequence of stopping times is always a stopping time,
MEAN FIELD GAMES OF TIMING AND MODELS FOR BANK RUNS 33
the infimum of a sequence of stopping times is only guaranteed to be a stopping time if the
underlying filtration is right-continuous [13, Theorem IV.55(c)]. 
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